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ABSTRACT 
 
ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment is required when any equipment or system potentially 
causes explosive atmospheres. Despite many operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous 
substances are performed by operators, influences of human and organizational factor (HOF) are 
mostly neglected. This research work, according to the overview of the general risk assessment and 
human factor integration techniques, focuses on the HOF influence on a specific application domain: 
the ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment domain. The integrated ATEX risk assessment 
methodology with HOF is proposed. The ATEX-HOF methodology provides a quantitative risk 
analysis approach with taking into account of HOF. Inside each phase, clearly assessment goals are 
identified which are enable to conduct the ATEX risk assessment with simplified ‘step-by-step’. An 
event tree based probabilistic assessment has been introduced, which is taking into account both the 
technical barrier failure (Prtbf) and the human intervention (e.g. operational failure, and/or operational 
barrier failure) in terms of Human Error Probability (HEP). Hence, the ATEX-HOF risk assessment 
becomes more complete than the traditional approach. 
 
Two on-site applications shown how taking into account HOFs is particular important in companies 
where the safety culture is lower and consequently the usual hypothesis of the correctness of operator 
intervention (in maintenance, normal operations, and emergency) could bring to not conservative 
results. The applied operational (HOF) barriers explicated in the analysis can be used to support for 
defining a more detailed set of operational procedures, which is able to maintain the risk level 
evaluated. 
 
In addition, since several accident investigations have found that 80% correspond to human error, in 
nowadays, the change in safety has focused on developing good safety cultures that positively 
influence human behaviour at work to reduce errors and violations. HOF as the major consideration 
within the safety culture plays an important role in the Safety Management System (SMS). Safety 
culture is not a difficult idea, but it is generally considered as “trust”, “values” and “attitudes”, which is 
difficult to clarify the meaning in practise. The Event tree based probabilistic assessment method has 
been introduced to quantify the HOF influence. This research, hence, can be concerned as an attempt to 
handle safety cultures in practice via the integration of the risk assessment.       
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SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
I. About the INNHF Project 
 
This research work forms part of the EU FP7 funded Marie Curie Actions Initial Training Networks 
research project titled Innovation through Human Factors in Risk Analysis and Management (INNHF -
FP7-PEOPLE-2011-ITN: Project ID 289837).  
 
The aims of the project INNHF are (www.innhf.eu): “ 
1) to offer a multidisciplinary training in the field of risk assessment and maintenance 
management integrated with human factors, in tight contact with companies and universities 
within this consortium; 
2) to strengthen and structure initial training of researchers in system engineering at European 
level; 
3) to attract students to scientific careers; 
4) to provide trained researchers with the necessary skills to work in industry; and,  
5) to improve career perspectives by broad skills development. ”  
 
S&T objectives of the research programme are:   
The INNHF main objective is to formalize an approach and make it possible to integrate the current 
and developing assessment methods recommended or required by recognized industrial standards and 
methodologies, with an easy to use but complete human factors and system health management 
approach. 
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II. Objectives and Roadmap of This Research 
 
ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment is required when any equipment or system 
potentially causes explosive atmospheres. Despite many operations on plant and equipment containing 
dangerous substances are performed by operators, influences of human and organizational factor 
(HOF) are mostly neglected (e.g. maintenance activities, operational barriers, and other operational 
activities, etc.). This research work, according to the overview of the general risk assessment and 
human factor integration techniques, focuses on the HOF influence on a specific application domain: 
the ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment domain. It aims to propose an advanced 
methodology, in order to analyse the HOF influence on ATEX hazards. The roadmap of this research 
was followed: 
 
Stage 1. Introduction & Background Information Collection: With the review of current risk 
assessment relevant standards and the conducting the interviews in current industries, a question 
occurs: “Are current safety standards and their suggested risk assessment methodologies enough to 
apply without considering human and organizational factors (HOF)?” (Chapter 1) 
 
Stage 2. Literature Review: Current risk assessment methodologies suggested by standards and 
human factor integration (HFI) techniques were reviewed, in order to find a way to integrate HOF into 
the risk assessment methodology. (Chapter 2) 
 
Stage 3. The ATEX-HOF Methodology Development: Relevant ATEX risk assessment 
methodologies were focused, with the aim of working on the current safety culture and human factors 
interventions, hence, an advanced methodology was proposed to analyse HOF influences on ATEX 
hazards.  (Chapter 3 & 4) 
 
Stage 4. Application: Two applications of the ATEX-HOF Methodology were conducted (one is in a 
food industry and another is in an automotive industry) were conducted. Meanwhile, the comparison of 
the traditional and ATEX-HOF Methodology was conducted, in order to see the performance of the 
ATEX-HOF Methodology, and improve the methodology. (Chapter 5, 6, & 7) 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Are current safety standards and their suggested risk assessment methodologies enough 
to apply without considering human and organizational factors (HOF)? 
 
 
Chapter Outline: 
1.1 Background 
1.2 A Need for a Standard 
1.3 Risk Assessment and Its Relevant Standards 
1.4 Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) 
1.5 Interview: Current Risk Assessment Standards Applied in Industries 
1.6 Discussion 
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 Chapter 1. Introduction    1.1 Background   
Start from July 2003, EU organizations must follow the directives to protect employees away from 
explosion risks under potential explosive atmosphere environment. Two ATEX directives were 
proposed:  
 
 the ATEX 95 equipment directive 94/9/EC, Equipment and protective systems intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres; the ATEX 94/9/EU has updated and will be removed and 
replaced by a new Directive 2014/34/EU, which will be mandatory for manufacturer in 2016.  
 
 the ATEX 137 workplace directive 99/92/EC, Minimum requirements for improving the safety 
and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres.  
 
As the requirement from ATEX directives,  
                                      
“It is the duty of Member states to protect, on their territory, the safety and health of 
persons and, where appropriate, domestic animals and property and, in particular, that 
of workers, especially against the hazards resulting from the use of equipment and 
systems providing protection against potentially explosive atmospheres.” 
 
“In view of the nature of the risks involved in the use of equipment in potentially 
explosive atmospheres it is necessary to establish procedures applying to the 
assessment of compliance with the basic requirements of the Directives.” (Directive 
94/9/EC, 1994) 
 
ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment is designed for the workplace safety and is required 
where any equipment or protective systems are intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
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The directive 99/92/EC has been referred, which lays down minimum requirements for the safety and 
health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres. For the prevention of and 
protection against explosions, the employer shall take technical and/or organizational measures 
appropriate to the nature of the operation, in order to: 
- prevent the formation of explosive atmospheres, or where the nature of the activity does not 
allow that, 
- avoid the ignition of the explosive atmospheres, and 
- mitigate the detrimental effects of an explosion so as to ensure the health and safety of workers. 
 
For assessment of explosion risks, at least it is taking account of: “ 
- the likelihood that explosive atmospheres will occur and their persistence, 
- the likelihood that ignition sources, including electrostatic discharges, will be present and 
become active and effective, 
- the installations, substances used, processes, and their possible interactions, 
- the scale of the anticipated effects. ” 
 
The ATEX Area classification deals with situations of normal operation, maintenance, and predictable 
failures; and it is mainly referred to two standards: IEC 60079-10-1 (for explosive gas atmosphere, 
2008) and IEC 60079-10-2 (for explosive dust atmosphere, 2009). For specific applications, different 
countries developed dedicated guidelines, as in Italy CEI 31-35 (2012) and CEI 31-56 (2007). These 
standards and guidelines provide procedures to evaluate the likelihood to have explosive atmosphere in 
the workplace.  
 
Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as a 
dangerous zone. EN 13463-1 (2009) is a standard for Non-electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially 
Explosive Atmospheres. The standard aims to provide the basic method and requirements for design, 
construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres. Following the procedure, the equipment can be verified and marked with ATEX 
markings for the further use in different ATEX zones’ working environment. EN 13463-1 covers most 
common ignition sources and explicates the method to identify and assess the likelihood to have 13 
ignition sources listed in EN 1127-1 (2011).  
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Consequence analysis deals with the potential impact of the explosion scenario on human, 
environmental and equipment. Different ATEX risk assessment methods reviewed have different 
focuses: such as estimation of the overpressure and the distance from the source, the exposure of 
workers, the level of human harm, etc. 
 
As mentioned above, the following standards are mainly applied among conducting the ATEX risk 
assessment: 
 IEC 60079-10-1, 2008, Explosive atmospheres - Part 10-1: Classification of areas - Explosive 
gas atmospheres. 
 IEC 60079-10-2, 2009, Explosive atmospheres - Part 10-2: Classification of areas - Explosive 
dust atmospheres. 
 EN 1127-1, 2011, Explosive atmospheres - explosion prevention and protection - Part 1: Basic 
concepts and methodology. 
 EN 13463-1, 2009, Non-electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
 
However, when reviewing the ATEX risk assessment procedures, despite many operations on plant and 
equipment containing dangerous substances are performed by operators, the influence of human and 
organizational factors (HOF) are neglected (e.g. maintenance activity).  
 
Hence, a questions occurs: “Are current safety standards and their suggested risk assessment 
methodologies enough to apply without considering human and organizational factors (HOF)?” 
 
1.2 A Need for a Standard  
“A STANDARD is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, 
processes and services are fit for their purpose” (www.iso.org).  
 
Some common principles are considered for standards in the development (www.iso.org): a) standards 
respond to a need in the market; b) standards are based on expert opinions; c) standards are developed 
through a multi-stakeholder process; d) standards are based on a consensus.  
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There are standards at international and national level that cover a big range of applications. ISO 
(International Standardization Organization) is a worldwide network of standardization organisations. 
ISO prepares and publishes international standards, ensuring that products and services are safe, 
reliable and of good quality. For electro technological standardisations there is another worldwide 
organisation, IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) that deals with electrical, electronic and 
related technologies. ISO and IEC are in close collaboration on all matters of electrotechnical 
standardization. In European level there is the CEN (European Committee for Standardization), which 
is a group of standardisation organisations that provide standards for EU and future EU member states. 
Each EU member has also its own Standardisation organisation for national standards and legal 
purposes (INNHF Work Package 3, 2013). 
 
1.3 Risk Assessment and Its Relevant Standards  
The definitions of “hazard” and “risk” referred to the work of Health and Safety Authority (2006): 
 
“HAZARD in general means an event or anything that can cause harm (e.g. dangerous 
chemicals, electricity, working at heights, etc.). 
 
RISK is the likelihood, great or small, that someone will be harmed by the hazard, 
together with the severity of harm suffered. Risk also depends on the number of people 
exposed to the hazard.” 
 
Risk assessment provides an understanding of risks, their causes, consequences and their probabilities 
(Figure 1.1, ISO/IEC 31010: 2009). Specifically, risk identification answers the question what can 
happen and why, and the potential consequences? Risk analysis answers the questions what is the 
probability or the severity of consequences? And what is the level of the risks? Risk evaluation answers 
the question is the level of risk tolerable or acceptable (ALARP), and does it require further mitigation 
control? Last 20 years, many risk assessment techniques have been developed to undertake risks on an 
industrial plant (Tixier et al., 2002; ISO/IEC 31010, 2009; and Marhavilas et al., 2011).  
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“RISK ASSESSMENT is a careful examination of what, in the workplace, could cause 
harm to people, so that the employer can weigh up whether he or she has taken enough 
precautions or should do more to prevent harm” (Health and Safety Authority, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Risk assessment in the risk management process (ISO/IEC 31010: 2009)   
 
ISO 31000:2009, ISO Guide 73:2009 and ISO/IEC 31010:2009 are the three relevant standards for all 
sectors, provide general guidelines and techniques for organizations of safety management plan design 
(ISO 31000), and the framework, procedure, and techniques of risk assessment (ISO/IEC 31010). 
These standards provide the background and basic principles of the risk management and risk 
assessment techniques. 
 
Risk assessment process generally divided into risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation 
(ISO/IEC 31010:2009). Controlling risk is the control of the likelihood or probability and the 
consequences of a given hazard causing a particular level of loss of damage (Alexander, 2000). 
 
ISO 31000:2009, Risk management – Principles and guidelines, provides principles and generic 
guidelines on risk management, which can be used by any public, private or community enterprise, 
association, group or individual. It is not specific to any industry or sector and can be applied to any 
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type of risk. These generic guidelines are not intended to suggest uniformity and certification of risk 
management across organizations. The design and implementation of risk management plans and 
frameworks will need to take into account the varying needs of a specific organization.  
 
ISO Guide 73:2009, Risk management – Vocabulary, complements ISO 31000 by providing a 
collection of terms and definitions relating to the management of risk. 
 
ISO/IEC 31010:2009, Risk management – Risk assessment techniques, focuses on risk assessment. 
Risk assessment helps decision makers understand the risks, identify risks, analyze risks, and evaluate 
risks, in order to provide the valuable decision of risk control. ISO/IEC 31010:2009 focuses on risk 
assessment concepts, processes and the selection of risk assessment techniques. 
 
Apart from those standards, there are other safety and risk assessment related standards that focus on 
specific application domains, such as ISO 22000 for the food safety management, IEC 60079 series for 
the explosive atmosphere risk assessment, IEC 61508 series for the function safety of electrical safety-
related systems, ISO 14121 series for the safety of machinery, IEC 61511 series for the function safety 
of safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector, and so on. 
 
1.4 Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) 
 
1.4.1 HOF in the Lifecycle of a System  
Risk Identification is the process of finding, recognizing and recording risks, which establishes the 
bases of the risk analysis (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). The objective is to reveal all possible potential 
hazards that exist in a system or organization. The whole risk assessment would be affected if the risk 
identification is not conducted properly. In the industry fields, a system could be designed for a 
manufacturing industry, a process industry, a power plant, etc. Parnell, et al. (2010) used the definition 
of “system” from INCOSE (http://www.incose.org):  
 
A system is “an integrated set of elements that accomplishes a defined objective. These 
elements include products (hardware, software, firmware), processes (policies, laws, 
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procedures), people (managers, analysts, skilled workers), information (data, reports, 
media), techniques (algorithms, inspections, maintenance), facilities (hospitals, 
manufacturing plants, mail distribution centers), services (evacuation, 
telecommunications, quality assurance), and other support.”  
 
Systems are dynamic that the passage of time affects their elements, functions, interactions, and value 
delivered to stakeholders. The concept of “system life cycle” was described with dynamic behaviour: 
 
A system life cycle is “a conceptual model that is used by system engineers and 
engineering managers to describe how a system matures over time. It includes each of 
the stages in the conceptualization, design, development, production, deployment, 
operation, and retirement of the system elements (Parnell, et al., 2010).” 
 
The identification of risks in a system is finding, recognizing and recording potential hazards within a 
system life cycle. Here is a simple machine manufacturing system life cycle (Figure 1.2): 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Figure 1.2 Three risk factors within a system life cycle 
 
Functional Failure 
Maintenance 
HOF 
Functional 
HOF 
HOF 
Maintenance 
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As mentioned in IEC 60204, machinery / machine defines as “assembly of linked parts or components, 
at least one of which moves, with the appropriate machine actuators, control and power circuits, 
joined together for a specific application, in particular for the processing, treatment, moving or 
packing of a material”. From SKF Annual Report (2010), a machine’s lifecycle has been expressed as 
the phases of “design and development”, “manufacture and assembly”, “operation and monitoring”, 
and “maintenance and repairing”; afterward, given to the feedback from the “maintenance and 
repairing”, the system goes back to the “design and development” phase for the further improvement. 
In each phase of a machine’s lifecycle, three risk factors have been identified: system function, human 
and organizational factor (HOF), and maintenance. Those three factors can influence the life of a 
machine (enlarge or reduce its life).   
 
Among the lifecycle of a machine, its functional failure may be original from the inappropriate 
design, incorrect manufacture, assembly, installation, and/or the incorrect operation. Functional Failure 
depends on whether a system or equipment is operating correctly in response to its inputs (IEC 61508-
1, 2010). It is always considered among the whole lifecycle of a machine, and almost all the safety 
relevant standards are concerning of the functional performance, such as ISO 14121, IEC 61508, IEC 
61511, IEC 62061, etc.  
 
Maintenance typically is a management plan and a range of activities performed by humans to “ensure 
the ability to maintain equipment or structures in, or restore them to, the functional state required by 
the purpose for which they were conceived” (IEC60300, 2003). Equipment, even well designed, will 
not remain safe or reliable if they are not maintained (Baraldi, 2013). Maintenance could make its main 
effects on the phase of “manufacture and assembly”, and the phase of “maintenance and repair”. Well 
designed and performed maintenance plan will reduce the probability of occurrence of potential 
hazards from equipment failure, and further directly influence the result of risk assessment. Therefore, 
it is necessary to identify hazards also arise from incorrect maintenance plan and activities during the 
risk assessment process. 
 
The third identified risk factor is Human and Organizational Factors (HOF). HOF influences among 
the whole machine’s lifecycle while the machine is designed, manufactured, assembled, operated, 
monitored, and improved. For many researchers the terms - “Ergonomics” and “Human Factors” are 
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and should be used as synonymous. Others emphasize that ERGONOMICS (originally developed in 
Europe) is strongly grounded on biological sciences, with the research emphasis put on equipment and 
workspace design according to human needs, in order to optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance. Ergonomists contribute to the design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, and systems 
in order to make them compatible to the needs, abilities and limitations of people. Whereas HUMAN 
FACTORS (first emerged in the USA) has its scientific roots grounded in psychology, putting much 
emphasis on the integration of human considerations into the total system process (International 
Ergonomics Association, 2000). Human Analysts contribute to the human risk assessment, in order to 
identify, analyse, evaluate and control hazards potentially caused by human in a system.  
 
1.4.2 HOF within Safety Management System (SMS) 
 
Organizational culture is well known as the critical influence on an organization’s success or failure. 
Safety culture, as being fundamental to an organization’s ability, aims to manage safety-related aspects 
of its operations – successfully or otherwise (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Several accident 
investigations have found that 80% correspond to human error and 20% correspond to technical 
failures (Reason, 1997; Hale & Glendon, 1987). The root cause of such disasters was the failure of 
existing Safety Management Systems (SMS, Reyes & Beard, 2001). 
 
Senior management develops a top-down driven strategy on safety as part of an organisation's overall 
strategy for business or other mission. A key aspect is a SMS, which includes safety performance 
measurement, risk assessment and control, human resource management and safety culture (Figure 1.3, 
Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Within the SMS, safety culture that causes human factor interventions 
generally considered as “trust”, “values” and “attitudes”, which is difficult to clarify the meaning in 
practise (HSE, 2016). Now, the change in safety has focused on developing good safety cultures that 
positively influence human behaviour at work to reduce errors and violations (HSE, 2016).  
 
Risk assessment, as another component within the SMS, permit an exhaustive identification of 
potential hazardous sources to prevent accident scenarios and to assess potential impact on human, 
environmental and equipment. However, when reviewing relevant risk assessment methods, instead of 
human that is dealing with the consequence analysis (the level of human harm, the exposure of 
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 20 of 153  
workers, etc.), the HOF influence on identified hazards are less considered, even in some risk 
assessment that is neglected factor.    
 
 
Figure 1.3 A strategic (top down) approach to safety (Glendon & Stanton, 2000)  
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1.5 Interview: Current Risk Assessment Standards Applied in Industries 
 
The European Project INNHF (www.innhf.eu, 2012-2015) aims to formalize an approach and make it 
possible to integrate the current risk assessment methods recommended (or required) by recognized 
industrial standards and methodologies, with an easy to use but complete human factors and system 
health management approach. In the INNHF Work Package 4, the interviews were conducted in order 
to understand the current safety management in industries. 16 industries took part in the interviews by 
INNHF fellows, which include 8 process engineering and chemical industries, 2 of nuclear or energy 
engineering, 2 of mechanical or automotive engineering, 3 consultancies, and 1 regulator. The majority 
of the responses were from the process industry. The interviews have shown that usually a group or a 
HSE department, which integrates Safety, Health, and Environment together, take a responsibility of 
the safety culture within an industry. Different industries applied different standards or regulations to 
support their safety management systems (from international standards, national standards or 
regulations, to their own regulations).  
 
1.5.1 Standards Used to Support Risk Assessment in Industries  
According to the interviews, the industries have to follow the national regulations first in their safety 
management system (SMS). Meanwhile, they can also apply other standards to support SMS. During 
the interview recordings, 12 out of 16 industries (75%) prefer to follow international standards; 6 out of 
16 industries (37.5%) consider national standards; 5 out of 16 industries (31.25%) consider specific 
industry standards; and 4 out of 16 industries consider their own regulations (Figure 1.4). The 
international standards are the most preferred. OHSAS 18001, ISO 14001, ISO 9001 and ISO 
31000 are the standards that most industries prefer to obey as their foundation of the safety 
management system (Figure 1.5). 
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Figure 1.4 Standards applied to support the Risk Assessment 
 
 
Figure 1.5 International Standards Mentioned by Interviewed Industries 
 
1.5.2 Triggers for Risk Assessment  
Seven triggers for risk assessment are collected from the interview recordings, in order to understand 
the triggers for companies to conduct the risk assessment.  
- laws & regulations request 
- safety of work 
- project management 
- near-miss 
- changes of equipment, project, or process 
- periodic review 
- personal experience  
 
Figure 1.6 shows that “laws & regulations request”, “safety of work”, and “changes of equipment, 
project, or process” are the top three considerations among industries.  
 
 
Figure 1.6 Triggers for Risk Assessment 
 
1.5.3 Focus of Risk Assessment  
Figure 1.7 shows that “occupational health and safety”, “process safety”, and “environmental 
safety” are the top three important focuses for companies conducting risk assessment.  
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Figure 1.7 Focus of Risk Assessment 
 
As a summary, from the 16 interviewed industries, the results have shown that all sectors use standards 
to support their risk assessment and safety management. The international standards most used were 
OHSAS 18001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and ISO 31000. No human factors standards were mentioned by 
any interviewee.  
 
1.6 Discussion  
ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment as a specific application domain, the procedures 
given to the relevant standards were reviewed. Despite many operations on plant and equipment 
containing dangerous substances are performed by operators, the influence of human and 
organizational factors (HOF) are neglected (e.g. maintenance activity).  
 
ISO 31000:2009, ISO Guide 73:2009 and ISO/IEC 31010:2009 are the three relevant standards for all 
sectors, provide general guidelines and techniques for organizations of safety management plan design 
(ISO 31000), and the framework, procedure, and techniques of risk assessment (ISO/IEC 31010). Apart 
from those standards, there are other safety and risk assessment related standards that focus on specific 
application domains, such as ISO 22000 for the food safety management, IEC 60079 series for the 
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explosive atmosphere risk assessment, ISO 14121 series for the safety of machinery, etc. However, 
with reviewing the risk assessment methodologies suggested by those standards, Human and 
Organizational Factor (HOF) is a less considered (even a neglected) factor in a risk assessment, but can 
be identified among all phases of a system life cycle.  
 
Meanwhile, the 16 industries’ interviews were conducted by all INNHF fellows. As a part of the 
results, it has also shown that across all sectors use standards to support their risk assessment and safety 
management. The international standards most used were OHSAS 18001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and 
ISO 31000. No human factors standards were mentioned by any interviewee. 
 
Hence, questions occur: “Are current safety standards and their suggested risk assessment 
methodologies enough to apply without considering human and organizational factors (HOF)?” “How 
to analyze the HOF influence on identified hazards”, and “how to integrate HOF into current risk 
assessment methodology?” With these questions, in Chapter 2, an overview of current Risk Assessment 
Methodologies and Human Factor Integration (HFI) techniques was conducted, in order to try to find a 
way on the integration of HOF into risk assessment methodologies. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
How to Integrate HOF into Risk Assessment Methodologies? 
 
 
 
Outline: 
2.1 Current Risk Assessment Methodologies 
2.2 Human Factor Integration (HFI) 
2.3 Discussion: How to Integrate HOF into Risk Assessment Methodology 
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 Chapter 2. Literature Review   Risk assessment process generally divided into risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation 
(Figure 2.1).    
 
 
Figure 2.1 Risk Assessment Process 
 
1) Risk Identification  
“Risk identification is the process of finding, recognizing and recording risks, which 
includes identifying the causes and source of the risk, events, situations” (ISO/IEC 
31010: 2009). 
 
Risk Identification establishes the bases of the risk analysis. The objective is to reveal all possible 
potential hazards that exist in a system or organization. The whole risk assessment would be affected if 
the risk identification is not conducted properly. The risk identification phase is normally based on the 
sources: plan & diagram, process & reactions, products & materials, probability & frequency, policy & 
management, environment, texts & historical knowledge (Tixier et al., 2002). Many analytical methods 
have been developed for the use in hazards identification. ISO&IEC 31010 (2009) suggests three 
groups for the risk identification: a) Evidence based methods, e.g. checklists, reviews of historical data; 
b) Systematic team approaches where a team of experts follow a systematic process to identify risks; 
 
Risk Evaluation 
 
Risk Analysis 
Hazard Identify 
Risk Analysis of Probability  
Risk Analysis of Consequence 
 Risk Analysis of Risk Level 
Yes 
No 
Monitoring Is this risk tolerable (ALARP)? 
Mitigation of Risks 
 
Risk Identification 
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and c) Inductive reasoning techniques, such as HAZOP. Meanwhile, some techniques like 
brainstorming and Delphi methodology can also be introduced, in order to improve the accuracy and 
completeness. 
 
2) Risk Analysis  
“Risk analysis is about developing an understanding of the risk. It provides an input to 
risk assessment and to decisions about whether risks need to be treated.” (ISO/IEC 31010: 
2009). 
 
Risk analysis involves consideration of the causes and sources of risk, their consequences and the 
probability of those consequence occurrence. Most risk analysis techniques can be classified as 
qualitative and quantitative methods. For each method, deterministic method, probabilistic method or 
both of them can be applied. In ISO/IEC 31010 (2009) suggests three groups of risk analysis 
techniques: 
- Qualitative methods define consequence, probability and the level of risk by significance levels, 
such as “high, medium, and low”. 
- Quantitative methods estimate practical values for consequences and their probabilities, and 
produces values of the risk level in specific units. 
- Semi-quantitative methods use numerical rating scales for consequence and probability and 
combine them to produce a level of risk using a formula. 
 3) Risk Evaluation  
“Risk evaluation involves comparing estimated levels of risk with risk criteria defined 
when the context was established, in order to determine the significance of the level and 
the type of risk” (ISO/IEC 31010: 2009). 
 
The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist in making decisions, based on the outcomes of risk analysis, 
about which risks need to be treated and the priority for the risk control (ISO 31000:2009). In the 
summary from Tixier et al. (2002), the approaches for the risk evaluation can be grouped as: a) 
Management Decisions, b) List of Risks, c) Probabilistic Results, and d) Risk Index/Level. 
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Figure 2.2 Example of a Risk Matrix 
 
Among those approaches, the risk index/level is the easily applicable method. A common approach is 
to divide risks into three bands: upper, middle, and lower band. The “as low as reasonably practicable’ 
or ALARP criteria system used in safety applications follows this approach (ISO/IEC 31010, 2009). As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP Principle) And Still Stay In Business (ASSIB Principle) 
(Reason, 2008) were introduced as the two principles for the risk control. It is hardly to achieve both of 
these two things at the same time, at least, ALARP should be considered during the daily safety 
management. ALARP principle means keeping your risks “as low as reasonably practicable”, and 
ALARP are also from the abbreviation of the last five words (IEC 61508-5, 1998). It indicates a 
willingness to live with a risk so as to secure certain benefits, at the same time expecting it to be kept 
under review and reduced as and when this can be done. Figure 2.3 outlines the regions of ALARP, a) 
the risk is so great that it must be refused altogether, or b) the risk is, or has been made, so small as to 
be insignificant, or c) the risk falls between the two states specified in a) and b).  
 
If a risk falls between the two extremes (i.e. the unacceptable region and broadly acceptable region) 
and the ALARP principle has been applied. Below the tolerability region, the levels of risk are regarded 
as so insignificant that no need to do further improvements. If above the ALARP level, industries 
should consider how to reduce the risks in the unacceptable region in the ALARP level with a balance 
of costs and benefits, in order to keep operations of industries still stay in business (ASSIB). 
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Figure 2.3 Tolerable Risk and ALARP 
 
2.1 Current Risk Assessment Methodologies 
 
ISO/IEC 31010:2009 also described 31 risk assessment methodologies. Most of them are qualitative 
methods. In addition, Marhavilas, et al. (2011) reviewed the scientific literature from 2000-2009, and 
summarized 18 risk assessment methodologies in three groups: qualitative techniques, quantitative 
techniques, and hybrid techniques. It is illustrated for the reviewing period 2000-2009 that 53.71% of 
the application domain is in industry; 12.87% is in Transportations; 12.38% is in Mechanics; and 
others. Among the reviewed techniques, 65.63% of the methods are quantitative. In Chapter 2, the 
review work is mainly based on their contributions, and conducting the review of the common applied 
risk assessment methodologies in three groups: qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid groups.  
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2.1.1 Overview of qualitative risk assessment methodology  
Table 2.1 Overview of Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies 
Risk Assessment Methodologies Description Major Application Industrial Domain Risk Assessment Processes Support 
1) Brainstorming 
It is stimulating and encouraging free-flowing conversation amongst a group of knowledgeable people to identify potential failure modes and associated hazards, risks, criteria for decisions and/or options for treatment (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
2) Structured Interviews Individual interviewees are asked a set of prepared questions to view a situation and identify risks (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). Various Industries Risk Identification 
3) Scenario Analysis 
A method given to the development of descriptive models of how the future might turn out. It cannot predict the probabilities of identified changes but can assist in making decisions and planning future strategies by considering consequences (e.g. best, worst, and expected case) of foreseeable changes (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Various Industries Risk Identification Risk Analysis 
4) Checklists 
A systematic evaluation consists of lists of hazards, risks or control failures that have been developed usually from experience, previous risk assessment, or historical records of past failures (TECH 482/535 Notes, 2005). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
5) Task Analysis 
This process analyse the way that people perform the tasks and subtasks in their work environment in a retrospective mode during the detailed investigation of major incidents. Various methods can be applied to do task analysis, the main dimensions of methods are the action oriented approaches (e.g. HTA) and the cognitive approaches (e.g. CADET) (Embrey, 2000; Marhavilas et al., 2011). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
6) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
A simple, inductive, and qualitative method of analysis whose objective is to identify the hazards that can cause harm for a given activity, facility or system. It is most commonly carried out early in the development of a project when there is little information on design details or operating procedures (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Various Industries Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
7) Hazard Identification Studies (HAZID) 
The HAZID process can be based on the client’s hazard control hierarchy or based on one provided by consultancy firms. A process that breaks a project down into component parts for detailed analysis. This analysis helps identify hazards that could cause injury to personnel, asset damage or loss, environmental damage, loss of production, or liability/litigation. Hazards require some form of control in order to mitigate risks. Using this tool during early phases of the project may provide key information that determines whether the project is feasible (Siddiqui, et al., 2014). 
Various Industries Risk Identification Risk Evaluation 
8) What-if Analysis & SWIFT 
SWIFT was originally developed as a simpler alternative to HAZOP. It is a systematic, team-based study, utilizing a set of ‘prompt’ words or phrases that is used by the facilitator within a workshop to stimulate participants to identify risks (Ayyub, 2003; ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Chemical and Petrochemical Plant 
Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
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Table 2.1 Overview of Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies (cont.) 
Risk Assessment Methodologies Description Major Application Industrial Domain Risk Assessment Processes Support 
9) Sequentially Timed Event Plotting (STEP) Technique 
STEP provides a comprehensive framework for accident investigation from the description of the accident process, through the identification of safety problems, to the development of safety recommendations. It is the multi-linear event sequence, and uses universal event building blocks, organized into sequentially timed events matrices with links showing causal relationships among events to describe the processes required to produce outcomes of interest (Herrera & Woltjer, 2009; Marhavilas et al., 2011). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
10) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
A brainstorming, qualitative, and inductive risk assessment tool, meaning that it is a “bottom-up” risk identification approach, where success relies on the ability of subject matter experts (SMEs) to predict deviations based on past experiences and general subject matter expertise (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
 Chemical Process Industry 
Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation  
11) Hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) 
HACCP provides a structure for identifying hazards and putting controls in place at all relevant parts of a process to protect against the hazards and to maintain the quality reliability and safety of a product. HACCP aims to ensure that risks are minimized by controls throughout the process rather than through inspection of the end product. It is developed to ensure food quality (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Food Industry Risk Identification Risk Evaluation 
12) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
An FMEA is a design tool that is commonly defined as “a systematic process for identifying potential design and process failures before they occur, with the intent to eliminate them or minimize the risk associated with them”. FMEA procedures are based on standards in the reliability engineering industry, both military and commercial (IEC 60812:2006). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
13) Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
RCA is focused on asset losses due to various types of failures while loss analysis is mainly concerned with financial or economic losses due to external factors or catastrophes. It attempts to identify the root or original causes instead of dealing only with the immediately obvious symptoms (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Various Industries Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
14) Cause-and-effect analysis 
It is a structured method to identify possible causes of an undesirable event or problem. It organizes the possible contributory factors into broad categories so that all possible hypotheses can be considered. The information is organized in either a Fishbone or sometimes a tree diagram (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). 
Various Industries Risk Identification 
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2.1.2 Overview of quantitative risk assessment methodologies 
 
Table 2.2 Review of Quantitative Risk Assessment Techniques 
Risk Assessment Methodologies Description Major Application Industrial Domain Risk Assessment Processes Support 
Proportional Risk Assessment Technique (PRAT)  
Using the formula to calculate the risk, and each factor ranges 1-10 scale, the quantity R can be expressed in the scale of 1-1000; Based on the quantity R, evaluate the risk. The formula is: R=P*S*F Where R is Risk; P is the Probability Factor; S is the Severity of Harm Factor; F is the Frequency Factor. (Marhavilas et al., 2011; Reniers et al., 2005). 
Various Industries Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
Decision Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA) Technique 
Systematic approach for estimating risk, which is consisting of measuring and categorizing risks on an informed judgment of the importance of probability and consequence. Evaluate based on the Decision Matrix and decision-making table. The measurement of risk (R) can be expressed by the relation:  R=S * P where S is the severity and P is the likelihood. (Haimes, 2009; Marhavilas et al., 2011; Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008).  
Various Industries Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
F-N Curve 
Associated with operation of given complex technical system, using F-N curve to measure and evaluate the risk. The F-N curve according to the formula: 
 Where R is risk; Fk is the frequency of k-th accident scenario; and Nk is the number of fatalities resulting from k-th scenario. Evaluate whether risk (F-N curve) is inside the area of ALARP (Marhavilas et al., 2011).  
Chemical Process Industry Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
Quantitative Assessment of Domino Scenarios (QADS) 
The severity of accidents where propagation effects took place, generally named as "domino" or "knock-on" accidents, using the quantitative methods to assess a primary accidental scenario, a propagation effect, one or more secondary accidental scenarios, and an escalation of the consequences of the primary event (Cozzani and Zanelli, 2001; Landucci et al, 2012; Marhavilas et al., 2011). 
Various Industries Risk Analysis 
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Table 2.2 Review of Quantitative Risk Assessment Techniques (cont.) 
Risk Assessment Methodologies Description Major Application Industrial Domain Risk Assessment Processes Support 
Predictive, Epistemic Approach (PEA)  
PEA approach provides formal means for combining hard data and subjective information and allows predicting observable quantities, like occurrence, or not, of an accidental event, or the number of fatalities or the magnitude of financial loss in a period of time in the form of mathematical models. In view of forecasting accidental actions (AAs), PEA should define as a way of interpreting and specifying the frequency Fr(AA) and p.d. P (m|AA); The final result of forecasting an AA can be expressed by an action model Fr(x)=Fr(AA)(1-FX(x|πx)) Where,  p.d. is the probability distributions; x is the vector of AA characteristics; X is the random vector with a distribution function (d.f.), which models an epistemic uncertainty in x;  Fr(AA) is the frequency expressing the epistemic uncertainty related to a future occurrence of AA;  p.d. FX(x|πx) expresses epistemic uncertainty in the event X. (Apeland et al., 2001; Marhavilas et al., 2011). 
Various Industries Risk Analysis 
The Weighted Risk Analysis (WRA) 
WRA is an overall mathematical-economic decision problem for balancing safety measures for all kinds of aspects by expressing both positive/negative risks and benefits of a project. It is a tool using weighing factors for all risks, in order to make them comparable to each other in one-dimension (Marhavilas et al., 2011). Weighted risk analysis of different decision-making elements can be expressed as: 
 Where safety measures can be balanced as: 
 Ctot is the total costs; C0 is the investment in a safety measure; y is the decision parameter; j is the number of the year; r is the real rate of interest. 
Various Industries Risk Analysis 
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2.1.3 Overview of hybrid risk assessment methodologies 
 
Table 2.3 Review of Hybrid Risk Assessment Techniques 
Risk Assessment Methodologies Description Major Application Industrial Domain Risk Assessment Processes Support 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and quantifying the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET) (Ericson, 2005; Marhavilas et al., 2011). 
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an analysis technique that visually models how logical relationships between equipment failures, human errors, and external events can combine to cause specific accidents. It is a technique for identifying and analysing factors that can contribute to a specified undesired event (called the “top event”). (Marhavilas et al., 2011; Vesely et al., 1981; IEC 61025, 2006).  
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
Bow Tie Analysis 
Bow tie analysis is a simple diagrammatic way of describing and analysing the pathways of a risk from causes to consequences. It can be considered to be a combination of the thinking of a fault tree analysing the cause of an event and an event tree analysing the consequences (ISO/IEC 31010:2009).  
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) 
The IDDA method provides a full representation of the plant states during operations (ordinary, incidental or irregular operating conditions), as well as all the possible occurrences patterns (description of events), expressed in a set of mutually self-excluding sequences. Availability of the full set of alternative allows the complete spectrum of possible probability-consequence conditions to be used as a basis for decisions in risk reduction and control (Demichela & Piccinini, 2004). 
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
 
2.2 Human Factor Integration (HFI) 
 
With the growing in complexity, increased automation and functional sophistication of high-technology 
systems, apart from some events caused by an unusual or unforeseeable manifestation (such as an 
earthquake), in the majority of cases, human became the main or sometimes even the only cause 
(Hollnagel, 1998). There are still various considerations of “human”. An engineer may concern 
“human” as a system component with the consequence of success or failure of doing specific tasks 
(Swain & Guttmann, 1983). Psychologists may think human behaviour is essential for the causes of 
system failure. The more general used model is the socio-technical system. The main errors for human-
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machine interaction system are caused by the functional failure, human failure, and interaction between 
them (Figure 2.4, Marhavilas, et al., 2011). The management or the organizational structure (the 
organizational factor) is also considered as mediating variable that has potential influence on the failure 
of system.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 The relation between person-related, technology-related, and organization-related factors (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 Human factors is concerned with understanding the causes of human failures and preventing human 
failures, which is also an important part of managing “major accident safety’. In UK Ministry of 
Defence Report (2013), Human Factors Integration (HFI) was defined as “HFI is a systematic 
process for identifying, tracking and resolving People-Related considerations ensuring a balanced 
development of both technologies and human aspects of capability”. The report also mentioned that the 
HFI process covers six domains: Manpower, Personnel, Training, Human Factors Engineering, System 
Safety, and Health Hazards. The HFI process is intended to be seen as an activity that supports 
attention towards all six domains during the entire system design lifecycle.  
 
Stanton et al. (2005) conducted literature review that any method discovered was recorded and added to 
the database. The result of this initial literature review was a database of over 200 HF methods and 
techniques, including the following categories of technique: 
 
Human 
Technology Organization 
Actions at the “sharp end’ 
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Table 2.4 HF Technique Categories Summarized by Stanton et al. (2005) 
Method category Description 
1) Data collection techniques 
Data collection techniques are used to collect specific data regarding a system or scenario. According to Stanton (2003) the starting point for designing future systems is a description of a current or analogous system. 
2) Task analysis techniques 
Task analysis techniques are used to represent human performance in a particular task or scenario under analysis. Task analysis techniques break down tasks or scenarios into the required individual task steps, in terms of the required human-machine and human-human interactions. 
3) Cognitive task analysis techniques 
Cognitive task analysis (CTA) techniques are used to describe and represent the unobservable cognitive aspects of task performance. CTA is used to describe the mental processes used by system operators in completing a task or set of tasks. 
4) Charting techniques 
Charting techniques are used to depict graphically a task or process using standardised symbols. The output of charting techniques can be used to understand the different task steps involved with a particular scenario, and also to highlight when each task step should occur and which technological aspect of the system interface is required.   
5) HEI/HRA techniques 
HRA techniques are used to predict any potential human operator error that may occur during a man-machine interaction. HRA techniques are used to quantify the probability of error occurrence.  
6) Situation awareness assessment techniques 
Situation Awareness (SA) refers to an operator’s knowledge and understanding of the situation that he or she is placed in. According to Endsley (1995a), SA involves a perception of appropriate goals, comprehending their meaning in relation to the task and projecting their future status. SA assessment techniques are used to determine a measurer of operator SA in complex, dynamic systems. 
7) Mental workload assessment techniques 
Mental workload (MWL) represents the proportion of operator resources demanded by a task or set of tasks. A number of MWL assessment technqieus exist, which allow the HF practitioner to evaluate the MWL associated with a task or set of tasks. 
8) Team performance analysis techniques 
Team performance analysis techniques are used to describe, analyse and represent team performance in a particular task or scenario. Various facets of team performance can be evaluated, including communication, decision-making, awareness, workload and co-ordination. 9) Interface analysis techniques Interface analysis techniques are used to assess the interface of a product or systems in terms of usability, error, user-satisfaction and layout. 
10) Design techniques Design techniques represent techniques that are typically used during the early design lifecycle by design teams, including techniques such as focus groups and scenario-based design. 11) Performance time prediction techniques Performance time prediction techniques are used to predict the execution times associated with a task or scenario under analysis.  
Human error is a complex construct that has received considerable attention from the HF community. 
Human error is formally defined as “All those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or 
physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to 
the intervention of some chance agency’ (Reason, 1990) Human Error Identification (HEI) or Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques are used to identify potential errors that may arise as a result of 
man-machine interactions in complex systems. HEI/HRA methods can be used either during the design 
process, or to evaluate error potential in existing systems (Stanton, et al., 2005).  
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Considering even a simple interactive system, this requires an examination of the links between every 
possible cause and every possible consequence, it is impossible in practice to make a deterministic 
analysis. The common solution is to conduct a probabilistic analysis for instead (Hollnagel, 1998). 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques, as one of the important categories in the human factor 
techniques, aim to identify and quantify human error. Evans (1976) explained that human reliability is 
a probability that a person correctly performs some system-required activities in a required time period, 
and performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the system. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a 
method that human reliability is estimated, such as HEART, CREAM, NARA, THERP, SPAR-H, etc. 
(HSL, 2009; Nespoli and Ditali, 2010). Hollnagel (1998) considered HRA techniques with two 
categories: 1) Task-dominant approaches that concerns human doing a task as the consequence of 
success and failure; and 2) Cognition-dominant approaches concerns human cognitions as causes of 
the human failure. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of task-dominant Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques   
Table 2.5 Overview of task-dominant Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Techniques 
HRA Techniques Description Major Application Industrial Domain 
Potential to Apply within Risk Assessment Processes 
1) Task Analysis 
Task Analysis is a process of representing a human task in graphical or textual form to assist in the process of Human Factors analysis (Stanton et al., 2005). There are literally hundreds of different methodologies for Task Analysis ranging from textual depictions of the tasks to the popular graphical methods which are the commonly used within industry. Using Flow Charts to model a process is the most common method of Business Process Modelling. 
Various Industry Risk Identification 
2) Human Hazard and operability analysis (Human HAZOP) 
HAZOP is a technique that uses a committee (4-6 people) of experienced personnel to identify problems with the design or operational intent of a system. It involves a structured consideration of the engineering plans and procedures line by line and uses a keyword approach to identify problems that could occur within the system. “Human HAZOP” which is an application of the approach to focusing on human factors and human/error issues (Whalley, 1988). 
Various Industry Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
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Table 2.5 Overview of task-dominant Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Techniques (cont.) 
HRA Techniques Description Major Application Industrial Domain 
Potential to Apply within Risk Assessment Processes 
3) Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
THERP assumes that human errors for each task can be broken down into omission errors and commission errors. It uses enhanced PSA event trees and that it extends the traditional description of error modes beyond the binary categorization of success-failure. THERP focus the only one dominant factor to Human Error Probability (HEP); the nominal HEP is determined once the task is known and can be modified by other factors (PSFs) later (Swain & Guttmann, 1983; Zhiqiang et al., 2009). 
Nuclear Industry Risk Analysis 
4) Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Assessment  (SPAR-H) 
It does not provide specific guidance on how to perform human error identification, but does tell the analyst to decompose each task to either a diagnosis or an action subtask. The analyst determines the system activity type and then provides HEPs for the four combinations of the error type and system activity type. The HEP is adjusted based on eight basic PSFs and the dependency. It has a large U.S. experience base (Gertman et al., 2005; Chandler et al., 2006). 
Nuclear Industry Risk Analysis 
5) Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment (NARA) 
It is a data-based HRA technique and is a refinement of the HEART technique. NARA does not provide guidance on how to perform human error identification. Instead, the analyst must best match the task being analyzed to one of 14 generic tasks. It provides basic HEP values that apply to these generic tasks. Although NARA has not been applied to any specific domains, it is an enhancement of HEART (modifying the grouping of generic tasks and weighting of PSFs) and, most importantly, it uses the CORE-DATA human error data base (Chandler et al., 2006). 
Nuclear Industry Risk Analysis 
6) Workplace Analysis 
It is an assessment of your operations, procedures, processes, physical environment and individual workstations. It is a step-by-step, common-sense look at the workplace to find existing or potential hazards for a workplace. Normally, it includes three steps: a) reviewing previous injury records analysis and tracking; b) workplace security analysis, like using a checklist as a tool for walk through; c) walk through the worksite (SFM, 2010). 
Various Industry Risk Identification 
7) Workload Assessment 
One of the representatives is Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT). It is developed through the application of a scaling procedure known as conjoint scaling and event scoring. The Scale Development is used to train the subjects on the use of the descriptors and to obtain data concerning how these dimensions combine to create each individual’s personal impression of workload. The Event Scoring phase is the experiment where the investigator is interested in obtaining information about the workload associated with task performance (Potter & Bressler, 1989). 
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
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2.2.2 Overview of cognition-dominant Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques 
 
Table 2.6 Overview of cognition-dominant Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques 
HRA Techniques Description Major Application Industrial Domain 
Potential to Apply within Risk Assessment Processes 
1) Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method  (CREAM) 
CREAM is a context-dominant type HRA technique, and has been developed from the principled analysis of existing approaches and therefore contains a method, a classification scheme, and a model. CREAM has not been developed from the underlying model of cognition, but simply uses it as a convenient way to organize some of the categories that describe possible causes and effects in human actions (Hollnagel, 1998; Zhiqiang et al., 2009).  
Various Industry Risk Identification Risk Analysis  Risk Evaluation 
2) The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System  (HFACS) 
The HFACS system is a human error framework that was developed by the US military. It is based on the Reason “Swiss Cheese” model wherein incidents are identified as multiple failures in the safety barriers overlapping and leading to an incident, HFACS is an investigation tool to assist in investigative processes and to target training and preventative measures. The framework describes human error at each of the “four levels of failure” ranging from the unsafe acts of the operators, the preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and organisational influences (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  
Aviation & Transportation Risk Identification 
3) Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
It is a general method that is applicable to any situation or industry where human reliability is important. There are 9 Generic Task Types (GTTs) described in HEART, each with an associated nominal human error potential (HEP), and 38 Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) that may affect task reliability, each with a maximum amount by which the nominal HEP can be multiplied (Williams, 1985; Bell & Holroyd, 2009).  
Various Industry Risk Analysis 
4) A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA) 
The premise of the method is that significant human errors occur as a result of “error-forcing contexts” (EFCs), defined as combinations of plant conditions and other influences that make an operator error. It provides structured search schemes for finding EFCs, by using and integrating knowledge and experience in engineering, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), human factors, and psychology with specific information and insights from the analysis of accidents (Bell & Holroyd, 2009).  
Nuclear Industry Risk Analysis 
5) Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) 
MEDA is intended as an incident investigation tool and not as a traditional HRA technology (Rankin, et al., 2000) it does provide a taxonomy that could be useful for a new HRA approach as the MEDA taxonomy focuses on the organizational and design context outside of the error task, probing the environmental, documentation , intrapersonal, cultural and other factors that can influence an error within the environment.  
Various Industry Risk Identification 
 
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 41 of 153  
2.3 Discussion: How to Integrate HOF into the Risk Assessment Methodology?  
According to the reviewed risk assessment methodologies, qualitative approaches are easier to apply. 
Those qualitative approaches normally do not require a lot of time, more specific data resources, and 
most of these are cheap to use. However, the limitation is contributing the subjective results; and the 
high education level of experts are expected. Quantitative approaches can provide mathematical risk 
evaluation, most of them are time-consuming and more expensive to apply. Hybrid techniques combine 
advantages both of qualitative and quantitative approaches and are more reliable applied in the real 
workplace. The disadvantages of these hybrid approaches are mostly time consuming and more 
complicated to use. Thus, different risk assessment methodologies are suggested to apply in terms of 
various situations.  
 
In addition, given to the reviewed work from Tixier et al. (2002), those reviewed risk assessment 
methodologies have shown the limitations that should be considered as well: a) The more general the 
methodology is, the less specificities that can take into account. On the other hand, the more specific 
the methodology is, the less transposable to another case. b) Knowledge of people whom are 
conducting the risk assessment is quite important. c) The complexity of some methods requires specific 
training for their implementation. d) There is a great disconnection between risk assessment 
methodologies and human factors.  
 
2.3.1 HOF in the risk identification phase  
Risk Identification is the process of finding, recognizing and recording risks, which establishes the 
bases of the risk analysis (ISO/IEC 31010:2009). The objective is to reveal all possible potential 
hazards that exist in a system or organization. The whole risk assessment would be affected if the risk 
identification is not conducted properly. From general sources (Tixier et al., 2002) support for the risk 
identification, potential HOF influences can be found with those sources (Table 2.7):  
a) Plan & diagram: site, installations, units, fluid or gas networks, functioning, safety barriers, 
storage;  
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b) Process & reactions: operations description, tasks description, reactions and physical and 
chemical features, process characteristics, kinetics and calorimetrical parameters, normal 
functioning conditions, operating conditions;  
c) Products: products types, physical and chemical properties, quantities, toxicological data;  
d) Probability & frequency: failure type, failure probability, initiation and failure frequencies, 
human failure, failure rate, exposure probability;  
e) Policy & management: maintenance, organization, safety policy, SMS, transport management, 
equipment cost;  
f) Environment: site environment, topographical data, population density;  
g) Texts & historical knowledge: standards, regulations and documents, historical knowledge.  
Table 2.7 Potential HOF Influences among Risk Identification Sources 
Risk Identification Sources HOF Presence & Potential Influences 
1) Plan & diagram HOF can be present as one type of safety barriers. 
2) Process & reactions HOF can be described in the operation descriptions, tasks description, process characteristics, and operation conditions. 
3) Products -- 
4) Probability & frequency HOF has potential to fail (e.g. human error probability). 
5) Policy & management HOF plays an important role in policy and management part. 
6) Environment -- 
7) Texts & historical knowledge HOF are mentioned in standards, regulations, historical knowledge. 
  2.3.2 HOF in the risk analysis phase  
Risk analysis is dealing with the probability and consequence analysis, and then to determine the 
relevant risk level. The general approaches are conducting the qualitative, quantitative, or semi-
quantitative analysis.  
 
1. Qualitative methods 
1a. Deterministic, 
1b. Probabilistic, or 
1c. Both 
2. Quantitative methods 
2a. Deterministic, 
2b. Probabilistic, or 
2c. Both 
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Since the HOF identified in the process of the risk identification also has potential probability to fail, 
relevant human factors integration (HFI) techniques (e.g. Human Relibality Analysis, HRA) can be 
applied for the probability and consequence analysis, in order to support the risk level determination.    
 
2.3.3 HOF in the risk evaluation phase  
The risk evaluation of the HOF influence can be taken into account as either an independent part or an 
integrated solution. Figure 2.5 shows the interaction of the HOF and the system functions. Human 
errors from operational activities, maintenance activities, and insufficient management could contribute 
to functional failures. The HOF influence here is considered as an integrated part within the final risk 
evaluation. 
 
  
Figure 2.5 HOF influence on a functional failure among normal operations and maintenance activities 
  
 
 
 
Maintenance Activities Working Environment  
Insufficient Maintenance Management Human Error during Maintenance Executions 
Normal Operational Working Environment  
Human Error during Operational Executions  Insufficient Operational Management  
Functional Failure 
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Chapter 3. Specific Application Domain: the ATEX Risk Assessment  
Main Characteristics of Traditional ATEX Risk Assessment Methodologies 
 
Chapter Objectives: 
3.1 Methodology Review 1: Probabilistic ATEX Risk Assessment (ATEX-PRA) 
3.2 Methodology Review 2: FUZZY ExLOPA 
3.3 Methodology Review 3: DSEAR Methodology 
3.4 Methodology Review 4: RASE ATEX Risk Assessment 
3.5 Methodology Review 5: Cavaliere’s Manual 
3.6 Discussion: Main Characteristics of Traditional ATEX Risk Assessment Methodologies 
 
 
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 45 of 153   
 Chapter 3. Risk Assessment in a Specific Application Domain: the ATEX 
Risk Assessment 
 
Start from July 2003, EU organizations must follow the directives to protect employees away from 
explosion risks under potential explosive atmosphere environment.  
 
An explosive atmosphere is “a mixture of flammable substances with air, in the form of gas, vapour, 
dust or fibres under atmospheric conditions, which, after ignition, permits self-sustaining propagation” 
(CEI EN 60079-10-1, 2010). This potential hazard associated with explosive atmosphere is released by 
an effective ignition source (EN 1127-1, 2007). As a safety principle, “equipment in which flammable 
materials are handled or stored should be designed, operated and maintained, in order to guarantee any 
releases of flammable material that are kept to a minimum level, with regard to frequency, duration and 
quantity” (IEC 60079-10-1, 2008). ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment is required when any 
equipment or protective systems are intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. Some 
ATEX risk assessment methodologies were proposed: 
 
3.1 Methodology Review 1: Probabilistic ATEX Risk Assessment (ATEX-PRA)  
Lisi and Milazzo (2010) described a quantitative methodology of the explosive atmospheres (ATEX) 
risk assessment. This procedure requires a detailed knowledge of the system (workplace and activities).  
 
3.1.1 Step 1: Area classification 
 The area classification aims to identify the presence of zones characterized by the explosion hazard. 
The standard EN 60079-10 (2010) is needed, and other guidelines are used for the specific 
requirements from countries. Like in Italy, Guide CEI 31-35 (2012) and Guide CEI 31-56 (2007) are 
applied depending on the type of emission sources, such as gas, liquid or dust. These standards or 
guidelines provide the probability of explosive atmospheres (Table 3.1), which can be used for the 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
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Table 3.1 Probability and Duration of Explosive Atmospheres 
Area Classification Zone Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Formation in 365 days Duration, t (hour/year) 
Zone 0/20 P>10-1 t > 1000 h 
Zone 1/21 10-1>P>10-3 10 h < t < 1000 h 
Zone 2/22 10-3≥P>10-5 0.1 h < t < 10 h 
  3.1.2 Step 2: Probability of ignition source presence  
In order to obtain the probability of ignition source, first is to identification of ignition source where 
UNI EN 1127-1 (2001) provides a list of 13 main ignition sources to support (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 Possible ignition sources according to EN 1127-1 (2011) 
- Hot surfaces - Electromagnetic waves - Flames, hot gases - Ionizing radiations - Mechanical sparks - High-frequency radiation - Sparks from electrical equipment - Ultrasounds - Static electricity - Adiabatic compression - Catholic protection and corrosion protection - Chemical reactions - Lightning  
 
In order to handle with the quantification analysis of identified ignition sources, methods such as 
historical analysis, fault tree analysis, FMEA or FMECA, or specific analytic procedures could be 
applied to assess the probability or the likely effectiveness of each identified ignition source.    
 
3.1.3 Step 3: Consequences analysis  
The explosion consequences must be estimated for each identified emission source. The targets are the 
estimation of the overpressure and the distance from the source. Many simplified models are available 
in Lees (1996) and in the Yellow Book 1997, such as the equivalent TNT model and the equivalent 
piston model which allow the quantification of the distance where a pressure wave reaches the value of 
0.03 bar. 
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3.1.4 Step 4: Presence of workers 
 
The presence of personnel in workplace depends on the number of workers in the potential zones and 
on their probable presence. The number of workers involved in a potential explosion can be calculated 
by using the damage zones, and the probability of presence can be calculated by analysing the worker 
activities. The presence of workers pw (probability) is calculated by Eq. (3.1): 
 
                                                                                                                                                Eq. (3.1) 
where,  
- Ai is impact zone of the explosion;  
- Aest is the whole area of the establishment;  
- pi is the probability of the presence of personal in the establishment. 
 
3.1.5 Step 5: ATEX Risk evaluation 
 
Finally, Eq. (3.2) is proposed for the calculation of the risk, Rae (ATEX Risk):   
 
                                                                 Rae = pe × pa × pw                                                                      Eq. (3.2) 
 
where,  
- pe is the probability of release of an inflammable substance from an emission source;  
- pa is the probability of the presence of an ignition source;  
- pw is the presence of workers in the impact area (probability).  
 
As the major risk and smaller impact area can be studied in the same way, the authors provide the 
uniform approaches of risk evaluation, which is the ALARP acceptability criteria.  
     Rae  < 10-6                   Risk is acceptable; 
     10-6 < Rae < 10-4         Risk must be reduced as low as technically and economically possible; 
      Rae > 10-4                  Risk is not acceptable. 
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3.2 Methodology Review 2: FUZZY ExLOPA 
 
In order to determine explosion risk, the methodology called ExLOPA was proposed (Markowski, 
2007). The ExLOPA is based on the original work of CCPS (2001) for LOPA but takes into account 
some typical factors:  
1) the frequency of an explosive atmosphere occurrence,  
2) the probability of the presence of the effective ignition sources, and  
3) the probability of failure for appropriate explosion prevention and mitigation measures.  
 
However, the lack of detailed data on failure rates of the safety prevention and mitigation means, 
uncertainties in available data on probability of ignition sources as well as other imprecision a 
vagueness connected with the consequence analysis, may cause the uncertainty in results. The Fuzzy 
Logic can be assistant because it deals with uncertainty and imprecision. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the Structure of ExLOPA. Rn, defined as “the possibility of an explosion with 
unwanted consequences”, is expressed as in Eq. (3.3): 
 
                                               Rn (TEXP)=f (Fatex, PEFI, FSM, SC)                                                     Eq. (3.3) 
where, 
- Fatex is the frequency of the occurrence of an explosive mixture; 
- PEFI is the probability of the presence of an effective ignition source; 
- FSM is the probability of failure of safety measures; 
- SC is the severity of consequence of the explosion; 
- Texp is the time of exposure (work time). 
 
ExLOPA expresses all these variables in the form of qualitative categories. The relations between them 
are provided by “IF-THEN” inference engine rules. The exposure time is used to help for determining 
the final risk level via the risk matrix. 
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Figure 3.1 The Structure of ExLOPA (Markowski, et al., 2011)  
 
3.2.1 Step 1: Estimation of the frequency of mitigated explosion, KF   
Estimation of the frequency of mitigated explosion (KF) relies on three factors:  
- Frequency of an explosive mixture occurrence, Fatex; 
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- Probability of an effective ignition source, PEFI; 
- Probability of safety measures failure, FSM.  
 
The frequency of an explosive mixture occurrence is given by the classification of hazardous area 
according to the standard  EN 60079-10-1 (2010). The frequency category is provided in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Frequency category of atmospheric explosive mixture occurrence, Katex 
Classification of hazardous area Description  Persistence time (h/year) Frequency rate per year 
Linguistic frequency category, Katex Gas/Vapour Dust 
0 20 Will persist permanently or for a long period or frequently In normal operation >1000 ~1 P 
1 21 Likely to occur in normal operation (Occasionally) Also in the case of foreseeable faults >10 ~10-2 O 
2 22 Unlikely (not expected in normal operation) Even in the case of rarely occurring faults <10 ~10-3 U 
 
The standard EN1127-1 (2007) distinguishes thirteen types of ignition sources. Checklist can be 
applied with questions to identify: 1) the presence of ignition sources; 2) effectiveness according to 
MIE (minimum ignition energy); 3) the frequency of the identified ignition source occurrence. The 
probability category is provided in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Probability category of effective ignition source, KEFI 
Category Description Range of ignition probability 
Probability used in ExLOPA 
Linguistic probability category, KEFI Continuous (Certain) Operational type, e.g. electrostatic charges when pouring, mixing, pumping, filtering or open flames from burner Up to 1 ~1 CO 
Rare Due to occasional failure of control ignition parameters. E.g. hot surface from damaged surface of a boiler 0.1-0.01 ~10-2 R 
Very Rare Due to very rare failure of control ignition parameters. E.g. failure of intrinsically safe electrical equipment. (Ex) or radio frequency sources 0.01-0.001 ~10
-3 VR 
 
The types of safety layers for atmospheric explosion are provided by the standard EN 1127-1 (2007), 
which includes two main types: prevention layer (B1, B2, B3) and protection layer (B4, B5). The 
calculation used follows the requirements for the equipment and protective systems intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres (ATEX 100).  
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Table 3.5 Probability category of safety measure, KSM 
Category Description Range of failure probability 
Probability of failure on demand PFD 
Linguistic probability category, KSM 
Very high Basic requirements for control of ignition source plus possibly two additional independent explosion protection measures 0.01-0.001 ~10
-3 I 
High Basic requirements plus possibly one additional independent explosion protection measure 0.1-0.01 ~10-2 II 
Standard Basic requirements for ignition source Up to 1 ~10-1 III 
 
Given to the probability or frequency of each factor, the qualitative categories were identified. Hence, 
KF is estimated via the Fuzzy ‘IF-THEN’ rules. 
 
3.2.2 Step 2: Estimation of the severity of the explosion consequences, Ksc 
 
The severity of an explosion is described by the damages (or consequences) occurring due to the 
impact of the explosion scenario. It is a complex task which is usually given to consequence models. 
ExLOPA takes into account the estimation of the severity of consequences using matrix based on the 
level of human harm for each particular explosion scenario (Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 Severity of consequences category, KSC 
Category Description Explosive mass category (kg) Linguistic severity category, KSC Gas/Vapour Dust 
Negligible Very minor or no injury with no lost time 0-1 0-5 N 
Minor Minor injury, no lost time >1-5 >5-10 MI 
Medium Single injury with short lost time  (reversible effects) >5-10 >10-50 M 
Major Serious injuries – irreversible effects >10-50 >50-100 MA 
Catastrophic Fatality or multiple serious injuries >50 >100 C  
3.2.3 Step 3: Estimation and assessment of the explosion risk, KR  
The estimation of the explosion risk (KR) relies on the KF, KSC, and KEXP. KF and KSC are obtained via 
step 1 and step 2.  KEXP is the time of exposure which reflects the presence of workers in the hazardous 
zone. Three frequency categories are wstablished: High (H) representing almost continuous exposure; 
Noticeable (N) for occasional exposure; and Low (L) for rare exposure (Table 3.7). 
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Table 3.7 Matrix for category of time of exposure 
 Frequency of exposure Every day Every week Every month Every year 
Duration of exposure 
Below 1 hour N L L L 
1 to 4 hours H N N L 
Above 4 hours H H N N  
The risk assessment is based on the matrix: 
Table 3.8 Explosion risk matrix 
 Severity of consequences, KSC N-Negligible MI-Minor M-Medium MA-Major C-Catastrophic 
Explosion Frequency, KF 
A-very often TA TNA NA NA NA 
B-often TA TA TNA NA NA 
C-moderate A TA TA TNA TNA 
D-seldom A A TA TA TNA 
E-very seldom A A A TA TA  
According to Figure 3.1 (the structure of ExLOPA) and factors mentioned above, the input and output 
fuzzy sets of each factor are in terms of linguistic categories. Fuzzy logic rules can be expressed as:  
- For evaluation of KF: “IF Katex (category) and KEFI (category) and KSM (category) THEN KF” 
- For evaluation of KR: “IF KF (category) and KSC (category) THEN KR”. 
 
3.3 Methodology Review 3: DSEAR Methodology 
 
DSEAR (The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations of 2002) is the United 
Kingdom's implementation of the European Union-wide ATEX directive.  DSEAR are concerned with 
protection against risks from fire, explosion and similar events arising from dangerous substances and 
potentially explosive atmospheres.  According to the regulations, BCGA (British Compressed Gases 
Association, 2008) proposed a methodology: 
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3.3.1 Step 1: Area classification 
 
The area classification refers to BS EN 60079. It includes: 1) emission source identification; 2) 
likelihood of release; 3) operation condition (pressure and temperature); 4) ventilation conditions; 
hence, in order to determine the type of zone (both internal and external). 
 
The likelihood of release is divided into four levels (3,2,1,0), which are later used in a calculation in the 
risk assessment matrix: 
3- continuous (permanent or long periods of release to atmosphere during normal operation); 
2- primary (release expected during normal operation); 
1- secondary (release NOT expected during normal operation); 
0- probability considered negligible, DSEAR risk assessment not required. 
 
3.3.2 Step 2: Ignition source and personnel exposure  
Four categories of ignition source are mainly concerned: 1) Heat Energy, 2) Mechanical Energy, 3) 
Chemical Energy, and 4) Electrical Energy.  Meanwhile, the personnel exposed to these dependent 
upon the activity taking place. 
The likelihood of ignition source occurring are performed. As a result, one of four levels is assessed: 
3- Present continuously or for long periods (>1000 hours/year) 
2- Likely to occur (>10 <1000 hours/year) 
1- Not likely to occur or infrequent and for short periods (<10 hours/year) 
0- Not present 
  
3.3.3 Step 3: Risk assessment  
The risk assessment is given to probability, consequence and existing control measures utilising a 
ranking matrix. Three risk assessments (for normal operation, filling operations, and maintenance 
operations) are conducted because of the different particular operations. 
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The likelihood of explosion/fire is by multiplying the likelihood of a flammable atmosphere (taken 
from Step 1) and the likelihood of having an ignition source occurring (taken from Step 2). The value is 
up to a maximum of 9. The consequence & severity of explosion/fire refers to: 
 H=Major impact or major injury/fatality; 
 M=Serious impact or lost time injury; 
  L=Minor impact or first aid case. 
 
In the end, the risk matrix (Figure 3.2) is applied in order to assess the level of risk. 
 
Figure 3.2 Risk Matrix 
 
With the following risk definitions, and actions required. 
P1= Intolerable risk – work must not be started or continued until the risk has been reduced to an 
acceptable level. 
P2= Substantial risk which must be improved through risk reduction methods. 
P3= Moderate risk – efforts should be made to reduce the risk within a defined time period. 
P4= Risk is considered tolerable no additional controls required. Monitoring is required to ensure 
controls are maintained. 
P5= No action required. 
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3.4 Methodology Review 4: RASE ATEX Risk Assessment 
 There is EU Project named RASE Project (2000) “Explosive Atmosphere: Risk Assessment of Unit 
Operations and Equipment”. Within their report, a methodology for the risk assessment of unit 
operations and equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres was proposed: 
 
3.4.1 Step 1: Determination of intended use  
This step needs to be carried out with an understanding of the functioning of the equipment and/or unit 
operations and the way in which an incident or an accident develops. It includes the description of the 
system, equipment characteristics, product characteristics, functional analysis. 
 3.4.2 Step 2: Identification of hazards, hazardous situations and hazardous events 
 In this step, the emission sources, the type of potentially generated explosive atmosphere, the frequency 
of occurrence of explosive atmosphere, the presence and effectiveness of ignition sources are 
considered.  
 
3.4.3 Step 3: Risk estimation  
Risk Estimation shall be carried out for each explosion hazard or every hazardous event in turn by 
determining the elements of risk. In many situations it is not possible to exactly determine all the 
factors that effect risk, in particular those which contribute to the likelihood of a specified event 
occurring. Thus risk is often expressed in a qualitative rather than a quantitative way by using the risk 
matrix (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 Frequency-Severity Matrix relating to risk levels 
 
Meanwhile, safety measures and human factors are concerned here. Human factors can affect risk and 
shall be taken into account in the risk estimation. This may include some of the following aspects: a) 
interaction of persons with the ATEX products; b) interaction between persons; c) psychological 
aspects; d) design of the products in relation to ergonomic principles; e) capacity of persons to be 
aware of risks in a given situation depending on their training, experience and ability. 
 3.4.4 Step 4: Risk evaluation  Following the risk estimation, Risk Evaluation shall be carried out to determine if Risk Reduction is 
required or whether safety has been achieved. It is evident. in a risk level of A, the risk is so high as to 
be intolerable and additional risk reduction measures are required. Similarly a risk level of D can be 
considered to be acceptable and no further risk reduction is required. Risk levels B and C are 
intermediate levels and will normally require some form of risk reduction measures to make the risk 
acceptable.  
 
Thus the risk can be described either as: a) Intolerable: If the risk falls into this category then 
appropriate safety measures must be taken to reduce the risk. or as b) Acceptable: If the risk falls into 
this category then no Risk Reduction is required and the Risk Assessment is complete. 
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3.5 Methodology Review 5: Manual of the ATEX Directive Application (Cavaliere’s 
Methodology)  
Cavaliere and Scardamaglia (2005) and Cavaliere (2011) provided a methodology for the ATEX risk 
assessment that fulfills the requirements of both ATEX Directive 94/9/EC and related standards.  
 
3.5.1 Step 1: Area classification 
 The ATEX Area classification deals with situations of normal operation, maintenance, and predictable 
failures; and it is mainly referred to two standards: IEC 60079-10-1 (for gas, 2008) and IEC 60079-10-
2 (for dust, 2009). For specific applications, different countries developed dedicated guidelines, as in 
Italy CEI 31-35 (2012) and CEI 31-56 (2007).  
 
As a result from Step 1, the internal and external zone classification (Table 3.9) of all identified 
emission source are determined. Further, with the sum of extension calculation from all external zones 
(the vertical and horizontal dimensions), the envelop of the external zones are drawn on the layout to 
understand the critical area. Therefore, the final analysis is completed. 
 
Table 3.9 Area classification depending on the probability of an explosive atmosphere occurrence in a year  (CEI 31-35, 2012 & CEI 31-56, 2007) 
Area Classification Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Occurrence in 365 days (PSA) Descriptor 
Zone 0/20 P>10-1 Explosive atmosphere is continuously present, for long periods or frequently. 
Zone 1/21 10-1≥P>10-3 Explosive atmosphere is sporadically present, during normal operations. 
Zone 2/22 10-3≥P>10-5 Explosive atmosphere is not present during normal operations, or infrequently present, for a short period. 
 
3.5.2 Step 2: Ignition source assessment  
Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as a 
dangerous zone. EN 13463-1 (2009) is a standard for Non-electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially 
Explosive Atmospheres. The standard aims to provide the basic method and requirements for design,  
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construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres. Following the procedure, the equipment can be verified and marked with ATEX 
markings for the further use in different ATEX zones’ working environment. Since EN 13463-1 covers 
most common ignition sources and explicates the procedure to identify 13 ignition sources listed in EN 
1127-1 (2011), the ignition source assessment takes a part of EN 13463-1 to apply as the method for 
the ignition source assessment.  
 
3.5.3 Step 3: Damage analysis  
The Damage analysis relies on the Area classification result (represented as the ID index which can be 
determined with the Table 3.10) and other factors: Personnel presence (PL), Dust explosion index 
(KST), Gas explosion index (KG), Cloud volume (VZ), Layer thickness (SS), Confined Dust Cloud 
(CN). Given to the guidance of the ATEX risk assessment application (Cavaliere and Scardamaglia, 
2005; and Cavaliere, 2011), the formulas and indexes support the calculation of the semi-quantitative 
parameter D:  
                              D = ID + PL + KST + VZ + SS + CN (for dust)                                  Eq. (3.4) 
                                   D = ID + PL + KG + VZ + CN (for gas)                                         Eq. (3.5) 
 
3.5.4 Step 4: ATEX Risk evaluation  
After the P, C, and D values are determined through the results from Step 1 to Step 3, the ATEX Risk 
evaluation relies on a semi-quantitative approach as in Eq. (3.6). 
                                                       R = P × C × D                                                                                             Eq. (3.6) 
According to Table 3.10, the values of P, C, and D can be determined through the results from Step 1 to 
Step 3. The ATEX risk (R) was the multiplication of P, C, and D (R = P×C×D), and the final risk level 
can be ranked (Table 3.11).  
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Table 3.10 The semi-quantitative ranking system for the ATEX-HOF risk evaluation 
Semi-Quantitative Ranking System Area Classification Zone P Degree C ID 
Zone 0/20 3 Frequently 3 0.6 
Zone 1/21 2 Occasionaly 2 0.4 
Zone 2/22 1 Rarely 1 0.2 
Zone NE 0 N.E. 0 0 
Note: 1) The ID value showed in the table is based on the area classification zones and is only the part of the D value calculation; 2) The D value is the sum of ID value and other factors; the maximum value of D for gas situation is 3, and the maximum value of D for dust situation is 3.6. 
Table 3.11 ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation Criteria 
Value (R) Risk Level Description Risk Control 
R ≥ 18 High High likelihood of presence of explosive atmosphere. Ignition sources are present and effective. Consequences of an explosion are extermely serious. Likelihood of explosion propagation is very high. 
Risk mitigation measures must be implemented. 
9 ≤ R < 18 Medium 
Likely presence of explosion atmosphere and ignition sources can be present and effective. In case of an explosions, consequences are moderate with marginal damage to personnel and process units. Explosion propagation is likely to be moderate. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a short time interval. 
1 ≤ R <9 Low 
The likelihood of presence of an explosive atmosphere is extremely limited, as well as the presence of effective ignition sources. The exposure level is low, so with limited damage to persons and property. The probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered extremely limited. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a long time interval. 
R ≤ 1  Negligible  
Likelihood of explosion atmosphere presence is very unlikely or ignition sources are not present or they are not effective. There are not consequences to personnel or equipment. Explosion propagation is very unlikely to occur.  
Operations should be kept monitoring in order to control the risk in this level. 
 
3.6 Discussion: Main Characteristics of Traditional ATEX Risk Assessment Methodologies  
From reviewed methodologies, the typical factors concerned with those ATEX risk assessment 
methodologies are:  
a) occurrence of explosive atmospheres: it mainly refers to the standard IEC 60079-10-1 for the 
explosive gas atmosphere and IEC 60079-10-2 for the explosive dust atmosphere;  
b) effectiveness of ignition sources: it mainly refers to the standard EN 1127-1 and EN 13463-1 
mentioned by some methodologies;  
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c) consequence: this part has various consideration depending on different methodologies. Some 
methodologies recommend mathematic modelling; some consider indexes; and some have taken 
into account of the impact on human. The major considerations are: exposure and duration of 
workers, dangerous distance and overpressure, etc. 
 
Not all methodologies treated safety measures as an independent factor, but they consider safety 
measures within the assessment of other factors (e.g. occurrence of explosive atmosphere, assessment 
of ignition sources).  
 
Most of those ATEX Risk Assessment methodologies handle HOF within the consequence analysis. It 
mainly focuses on the impact on human, such as the exposure and duration time of workers, the 
potential injury, and so on. However, the influence from HOF on the ATEX hazards, although only 
RASE ATEX risk assessment methodology mentioned, has been not dealt with specific procedures 
within those reviewed methodologies. 
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Integration of HOF into the ATEX Risk Assessment Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Objectives: 
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4.2 Application of HRA Techniques into ATEX Risk Assessment: from THERP to FUZZY CREAM 
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Chapter 4. The ATEX-HOF Methodology 
 
4.1 The ATEX-HOF Methodology   
Cavaliere and Scardamaglia (2005) and Cavaliere (2011) provided a methodology for the ATEX risk 
assessment that fulfills the requirements of both ATEX Directive 94/9/EC, Directive 99/92/EC and 
related standards. However, when reviewing the ATEX risk assessment procedures, despite many 
operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous substances are performed by operators, the 
influence of human and organizational factors (HOF) are neglected (e.g. maintenance activity). Here, 
the ATEX-HOF methodology is proposed based on the traditional methodology, with the aim of 
providing an advanced methodology to analyze HOF influences on ATEX hazards. The framework of 
the ATEX-HOF methodology is developed with four steps: 1) Area classification, 2) Ignition source 
identification, 3) Damage analysis, and 4) ATEX Risk evaluation (Figure 4.1).  
 
The original ATEX Risk assessment relies on a semi-quantitative approach as in Eq. (4.1). 
 
                                                                    R = P × C × D                                                                                         Eq. (4.1) 
 
The ATEX risk (R) is a function of the following parameters: probability of an explosive atmosphere 
formation (P), probability of an effective ignition source presence (C), and possible damages (D). The 
ATEX-HOF methodology was aimed at identifying the HOF influence in each step, and providing an 
integrated safety assessment approach. The ATEX-HOF risk evaluation is still using the semi-
quantitative approach as in Eq. (4.2):  
 
                                                            RHOF = PHOF × CHOF × DHOF                                                                      Eq. (4.2) 
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Figure 4.1 The framework of the ATEX-HOF methodology (Geng, et al., 2015a) 
 4.1.1 Step 1: ATEX-HOF Area Classification 
   
The area classification has been carried out when the initial process and instrumentation line diagrams 
and initial layout plans were available and confirmed before plant start-up. The ATEX Area 
classification deals with situations of normal operation, maintenance, and predictable failures; and it is 
mainly referred to two standards: IEC 60079-10-1 (for explosive gas atmosphere, 2008) and IEC 
60079-10-2 (for explosive dust atmosphere, 2009). For specific applications, different countries 
developed dedicated guidelines, as in Italy CEI 31-35 (2012) and CEI 31-56 (2007). Since the 
procedures conducting risk assessment for the explosive gas atmosphere and the explosive dust 
atmosphere are similar, here, the Area classification procedures for the explosive gas atmospheres are 
chosen to show in details.  
 
Step 1-1: Identification of source of release 
 The basic elements for establishing the hazardous zone are identifying the source of release and 
determining the grade of release. Since an explosive gas atmosphere can exist only if a flammable gas 
or vapour is present with air, it is necessary to decide if any of these flammable materials can exist in  
 
Risk Evaluation 
Monitoring 4. ATEX Risk Level Analysis RHOF= PHOF*CHOF*DHOF 
Mitigation of Risks 
5. Is this risk 
tolerable? 
 
 
 
Area Classification 
1. ATEX Area Classification Analysis → P 
1a. ATEX-HOF Area Classification Analysis Explicating HOF → PHOF 
 
 
 
 
Ignition Sources Assessment 
2. ATEX Ignition Sources Analysis → C 
2a. ATEX-HOF Ignition Sources Analysis Explicating HOF → CHOF 
 
Damage Analysis 
3. ATEX Damage 
Analysis → D 
3a. ATEX Damage Analysis Explicating HOF 
→ DHOF 
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the area concerned. Each item of the process equipment which contains flammable materials is 
considered as a potential release source, such as a tank, pump, pipeline, vessel, etc.  
 
Step 1-2: Determining the area classification inside the equipment 
 Normally, the type of the area classification inside the equipment (the internal zone) can be referred to 
the grade of release (IEC 60079-10-1, 2008): a) a continuous grade of release is expected to occur 
frequently or for long periods, and leads to a zone 0; b) a primary grade of release can be expected to 
occur periodically or occasionally during normal operation, and leads to zone 1; c) a secondary grade 
of release is not expected to occur in normal operation and, if it does occur, is likely to do so only 
infrequently and for short periods, leads to zone 2. 
 
Further, the flammable substances released into the atmosphere can be diluted by dispersion or 
diffusion into the air until its concentration is below the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Ventilation 
helps promoting dispersion, and Table 4.1 shows the influence of the ventilation on determining the 
type of zone. The effectiveness of the ventilation will depend upon the degree and availability of 
ventilation and the design of the system. 
 
Three degrees of ventilation are recognized: a) High ventilation (VH) can reduce the concentration at 
the source of release virtually instantaneously, resulting in a concentration below the lower explosive 
limit; further, leading to a negligible extent result. b) Medium ventilation (VM) can control the 
concentration, resulting in a stable zone boundary, whilst the release is in progress, and where the 
explosive gas atmosphere does not persist unduly after the release has stopped. c) Low ventilation (VL) 
cannot control the concentration whilst release is in progress and/or cannot prevent undue persistence 
of a flammable atmosphere after release has stopped.  
 
Meanwhile, three levels of availability of the ventilation should be considered: a) Good ventilation is 
present virtually continuously; b) Fair ventilation is expected to be present during normal operation. 
Discontinuities are permitted provided they occur infrequently and for short periods; c) Poor 
ventilation which does not meet the standard of fair or good, but discontinuities are not expected to 
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occur for long periods. Ventilation that does not even meet the requirement for poor availability must 
not be considered to contribute to the ventilation of the area (IEC 60079-10-1, 2008). 
 
Table 4.1 Influence of the ventilation on type of zone (IEC 60079-10-1, 2008) 
Grade of release 
Ventilation Degree High Medium Low Availability 
Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor Good, Fair or Poor 
Continuous (Zone 0 NE) Non-hazardousa (Zone 0 NE) Zone 2a (Zone 0 NE) Zone 1a Zone 0 
Zone 0 + Zone 2 
Zone 0 + Zone 1 Zone 0 
Primary (Zone 1 NE) Non-hazardousa (Zone 1 NE) Zone 2a (Zone 1 NE) Zone 2a Zone 1 
Zone 1 + Zone 2 
Zone 1 + Zone 2 
Zone 1 or Zone 0c 
Secondaryb (Zone 2 NE) Non-hazardousa (Zone 2 NE) Non-hazardousa Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 2 
Zone 1 and even Zone 0c NOTE 1 “+’ signifies “surrounded by’. NOTE 2 Particular care should be taken to avoid situations where enclosed areas containing sources that give only secondary grades of release might be classified as zone 0. This applies also to small non-purged and non-pressurized enclosed areas, e.g. instrument panels or instrument weather protection enclosures, thermally insulated heated enclosures or enclosed spaces between pipe installations and envelope of thermal insulation. Such enclosures should preferably be provided with at least some kind of appropriately located apertures that will enable unimpeded movement of air through the interior. Where that is not possible, practicable or desirable, effort should be made to keep major potential sources of release out of enclosures, e.g. pipe connections should normally be kept out of insulation enclosures as well as any other equipment that may be considered a potential source of release. NOTE 3 Continuous and primary sources of release should preferably not be located in areas with a low degree of ventilation. Either sources of release should be relocated, ventilation should be improved or the grade of release should be reduced. NOTE 4 The summation of sources of release with regular (i.e. well predictable) activity should be based on detailed analysis of operating procedures. For example, N sources of release with common mode of release should be normally considered as a single source of release with N different discharge points. 
a Zone 0 NE, 1 NE or 2 NE indicates a theoretical zone which would be of negligible extent under normal conditions. b The zone 2 area created by a secondary grade of release may exceed that attributable to a primary or continuous grade of release; in this case, the greater distance should be taken. c Will be zone 0 if the ventilation is so weak and the release is such that in practice an explosive gas atmosphere exists virtually continuously (i.e. approaching a ’no ventilation” condition). 
 
Step 1-3: Determining the area classification outside the equipment   
1) Initial External Zone Determination 
Determining the area classification outside the equipment (the external zone) is based on the release 
rate, LEL, ventilation and other factors and the estimated (or calculated) area over which the explosive  
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atmosphere insists before it disperses. Relevant standards and national guidelines (e.g. IEC 60079-10-1, 
2008; CEI 31-35, 2012) shows the technical procedures and information to perform the initial external 
zone determination. Here are some important factors that can influence the external zone 
determination: 
 a) Release Rate of Gas or Vapour: The greater the release rate, the larger the extent of the zone. 
The release rate depends itself on other parameters, namely and specifically for a methane 
release, like in the case under study: a1) Geometry of the source of release. This is related to the 
physical characteristics of the source of release, for example, an open surface, leaking flange, 
etc. a2) Release velocity. For a given source of release, the release rate increases with the release 
velocity. In the case of a product contained within process equipment, the release velocity is 
related to the process pressure and the geometry of the source of release. The size of a cloud of 
flammable gas or vapour is determined by the rate of flammable vapour release and the rate of 
dispersion. Gas and vapour flowing from a leak at high velocity will develop a cone-shaped jet, 
which will entrain air and be self-diluting. The extent of the explosive gas atmosphere will be 
almost independent of air flow. If the material is released at low velocity or if its velocity is 
reduced by impingement on a solid object, it will be carried by the air flow and its dilution and 
extent will depend on air flow. a3) Concentration. The release rate increases with the 
concentration of flammable vapour or gas in the released mixture. 
b) Lower Explosive Limit (LEL): For a given release volume, the lower the LEL the greater will be 
the extent of the zone. 
c) Ventilation: With increased ventilation, the extent of the zone will normally be reduced. 
Obstacles, which impede the ventilation, may increase the extent of the zone. On the other hand, 
some obstacles, for example, dykes, walls or ceilings, may limit the extent. 
d) Relative Density of the Gas or Vapour When It Is Released: If the gas or vapour is significantly 
lighter than air, it will tend to move upwards. If significantly heavier, it will tend to accumulate 
at ground level. The horizontal extent of the zone at ground level will increase with increasing 
relative density and the vertical extent above the source will increase with decreasing relative 
density. 
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e) Other Parameters to Be Considered: e1) Climatic conditions: The rate of gas or vapour 
dispersion in the atmosphere increases with wind speed but there is a minimum speed of 2 m/s – 
3 m/s required to initiate turbulent diffusion; below this, layering of the gas or vapour occurs and 
the distance for safe dispersal is greatly increased. e2) Applied Barriers: The release and the 
spreading of the flammable substances can be prevented by barriers: technical barriers (e.g. 
grounding system), human interventions (e.g. maintaining activities), and sufficient ventilation.  
 
2) Estimation of probability of failure of applied barriers and relevant operational activities 
The release and the spreading of flammable substances can be influenced by suitable barriers (technical 
barriers and/or operational barriers), sufficient ventilations, and other relevant human interventions. 
Apart from the ventilation condition handling by the specific procedure, other relevant operational 
activities and/or applied barriers are addressed via the quantitative approach. Both the extension and 
the probability of occurrence of the external flammable cloud must be determined with the 
consideration of those applied barriers and other relevant operations which have potential probability to 
fail (PrBF). In details,  
a) a probability of a technical barrier failure (Ptbf) can be estimated by using the function analysis 
with relevant technical documents;  
b) a probability of an operational barrier failure (HEP) can be estimated by applying human 
reliability analysis (HRA) techniques (e.g. FUZZY CREAM). Operational barriers are the 
specific activities especially for the safety prevention and protection (e.g. safety audit, safety 
inspection, etc.). 
c) a probability of other operational failure (HEP) can be estimated as the well as the operational 
barrier failure. Those operational activities are those daily tasks performing by 
operators/maintainers, in order to keep the system running in a normal operation condition. 
 
3) Event tree analysis and Final external zone determination 
The Event tree (Papazoglou, 1998) is here introduced for a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The 
initial event (Figure 4.2) has an initial probability (PrIN) that represents the internal explosive 
atmosphere occurrence. A series of possible paths are constructed by applied barriers and relevant 
operational activities. Each path is assigned with a probability of failure (PrBF) or success (PrBS).  
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The probability allows to calculate the likelihood of having an initial/additional explosive atmosphere 
(PSA). Where the PrIN is not available, otherwise, the initial probability can be assessed starting from 
the internal zone classification, according to Table 4.2 that correlates the area classification to the 
probability of their presence. 
Figure 4.2 Event tree structure for the external zone determination  Table 4.2 Area classification depending on the probability of an explosive atmosphere occurrence in a year  (CEI 31-35, 2012 & CEI 31-56, 2007) 
Area Classification 
Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Occurrence in 365 days (PSA) Descriptor Zone 0/20 P>10-1 Explosive atmosphere is continuously present, for long periods or frequently. Zone 1/21 10-1≥P>10-3 Explosive atmosphere is sporadically present, during normal operations. 
Zone 2/22 10-3≥P>10-5 Explosive atmosphere is not present during normal operations, or infrequently present, for a short period. 
  Initial Explosive  Atmosphere Occurrence 
Relevant Operational Activities 
Barrier 1:  Technical Prevention … 
Barrier N:  Operational Prevention 
Probability to have Initial/Additional  Explosive Atmosphere (PSA) 
       
Pr(Barrier N, Success) 
Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
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…
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…
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Pr(Failure) 
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Pr(Success) 
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… 
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Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
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Step 1-4: Results of the ATEX-HOF Area classification  
As a result, all identified release sources from both internal and external zone classification of any 
equipment are summarized (Table 4.3). Further, with the sum of extension calculation from all external 
zones (the vertical and horizontal dimensions), the envelop of the external zones are drawn on the 
layout to understand the critical area. Therefore, the final analysis is completed. 
Table 4.3 ATEX-HOF Area classification result 
Emission Source 
Internal Source of Release 
Internal Grade of Release 
Internal Zone 
External Source of Release 
External Grade of Release 
Relevant Operational Activities and/or Applied Barriers 
PSA (Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere) 
External Zone 
E.S. S.R. Continuous/ Primary/ Secondary 
Zone 0/20, Zone 1/21, Zone 2/22, Zone NE 
S.R. Continuous/ Primary/ Secondary 
Technical Barriers/ Operational Barriers/ Other relevant operational activities 
Integration of : 1) the initial probability (PrIN); and 2) Prob. of Barrier/operational Failure (e.g. HEP, Ptbf) 
Zone 0/20, Zone 1/21, Zone 2/22, Zone NE 
  
4.1.2 Step 2: ATEX-HOF Ignition Source Assessment  
Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as 
dangerous zone. EN 13463-1 (2009) is a standard for Non-electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially 
Explosive Atmospheres. The standard aims to provide the basic method and requirements for design, 
construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres. Following the procedure, the equipment can be verified and marked with ATEX 
markings for the further use in different ATEX zones’ working environment. Since EN 13463-1 covers 
most common ignition sources and explicates the procedure to identify 13 ignition sources listed in EN 
1127-1 (2011), ATEX-HOF methodology takes a part of EN 13463-1 to apply as the method for the 
ignition source assessment. General procedures include: 
 
Step 2-1: Presence of potential ignition sources  
EN 13463-1 (2009) provides a scheme for the ignition source identification, and defines four types of 
ignition sources and their relationship (Figure 4.3).  
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 Figure 4.3 Relationship of four types of ignition sources (EN 13463-1, 2009)  
Potential ignition sources are identified based on 13 possible ignition sources listed in EN 1127-1 
(Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Possible ignition sources according to EN 1127-1 (2011) 
- Hot surfaces - Electromagnetic waves - Flames, hot gases - Ionizing radiations - Mechanical sparks - High-frequency radiation - Sparks from electrical equipment - Ultrasounds - Static electricity - Adiabatic compression - Catholic protection and corrosion protection - Chemical reactions - Lightning  
 
Once the presence of the ignition source is identified, the frequency of occurrence will be assessed (EN 
13463-1, 2009): 
1) occurrence during normal operation is the situation when the equipment are operating for their 
intended use within their design parameters;  
2) occurrence during foreseeable malfunction is the situation when the equipment/person do not 
perform the intended function/tasks; and such disturbances are known to occur in practice;  
3) occurrence during rare malfunction is the situation that type of malfunction caused by 
equipment and/or person may happen only in rare instances;  
4) not relevant is applied when the situation is not mentioned among those three categories 
above.  
 
Step 2-2: Effective ignition sources assessment  
Possible Ignition Sources (13 Identified possible ignition sources listed in EN1127-1) 
Equipment Related Ignition Sources (Ignition sources caused by the considered equipment) 
Potential Ignition Sources (Any potential equipment related ignition source that is capable to 
ignite an explosive atmosphere) 
Effective Ignition Sources  (Any potential ignition source that can ignite an explosive atmosphere in normal operation, expected malfunction or rare malfunction) 
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It is known that one has to supply initial ignition energy to initiate combustion process in a flammable 
mixture air. A flammable mixture air can be ignited by an external source of energy such as electric 
spark, a naked flame, hot vessel walls, compression, etc. It is possible to ignite any flammable mixture 
only when the maximum generated energy is enough to ignite the mixture (above the minimum ignition 
energy, MIE). Normally, it could be conducted quantitatively, but more often, it can be conducted in 
the qualitative way. For example, in order to have an effective hot surface, the maximum surface 
temperature under the most adverse operation condition should be taken into account. For some of the 
ignition sources, specific standards exist to support their assessment, as the standard CLC/TR 50404 
(2003) for the static electricity.  
Table 4.5 Potential and effective ignition sources identification (developed from EN 13463-1, 2009) 
 No. 
1 2 3 Potential Ignition Sources Assessment of the frequency of occurrence without applied barriers Effectiveness (Y/N) a b a b c d e Potential Ignition Sources 
Description/ Basic Cause 
During normal operation 
During foreseeable malfunction 
During rare malfunction Not relevant Reasons for assessment 
         
  Step 2-3: Event tree analysis and final ignition likelihood estimation  
In case that identified potential ignition source is effective, applied barriers should be considered. Event 
tree is built (Figure 4.4). The initial event is characterized by the initial probability of the ignition 
source presence (PrIG). Series paths are constructed by applied barriers and/or relevant operational 
activities. The probability of failures can be result from the technical barrier failure (Prtbf) and/or 
human interventions (HEP). The probability allows to calculate the likelihood of having an 
initial/additional effective ignition sources. Since the initial assessment of the ignition source presence 
is a qualitative value, it cannot be calculated directly in the Event tree. Different from Area 
classification that can take advantage of probability indexes from Italian Guidelines, the ATEX-HOF 
Ignition source assessment linked with the uniform probability ranges from the Area classification 
(Table 4.6).  
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Initial Ignition Source Presence 
Relevant Operational Activities 
Barrier 1:  Technical Prevention …… 
Barrier N:  Operational Prevention 
Probability to have initial/additional ignition likelihood (PSA) 
       
Figure 4.4 Event tree structure for the ignition likelihood determination 
 Table 4.6 Linking probability ranges with the frequency of occurrence 
Ignition Likelihood 
Frequency of Occurrence Assessment for Ignition Sources (EN 13463-1, 2009) 
Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Formation in 365 days (CEI 31-56, 2007; CEI 31-35, 2012) 
Area Classification 
Frequently During normal operation P>10-1 Zone 0/20 Occasionally During foreseeable malfunction 10-1≥P>10-3 Zone 1/21 Rarely During rare malfunction 10-3≥P>10-5 Zone 2/22 N.E. Not relevant 10-5>P Zone NE 
 
Step 2-4: ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment result       
The ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment of each emission source is assessed in the conservative 
way. The maximum value of the ignition likelihood among all identified potential ignition sources will 
be chosen as the final result (Table 4.7).  
 
Pr(Barrier N, Succeed) 
Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
Pr(Barrier N, Succeed) 
Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
…
… 
…
… 
Pr(Failure) 
PrIG (Initial probability of the ignition source presence without 
barriers) 
Pr (Success) 
Pr(Failure) 
Pr(Success) 
Pr(Failure) … 
PrIN × PrBS1× PrBS2×… × PrBSN 
 
PrIN × PrBS1× PrBS2× … × PrBFN 
 
PrIN × PrBS1× PrBF2× … × PrBSN 
 
PrIN × PrBS1× PrBF2× … × PrBFN 
 
 
PrIN × PrBF1× PrBS2× … × PrBSN 
  
 
PrIN × PrBF1× PrBS2× … × PrBFN 
PrIN × PrBF1× PrBF2× … × PrBSN 
 
PrIN × PrBF1× PrBF2× … × PrBFN 
Pr(Success) …
… 
Pr(Barrier N, Succeed) 
Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
Pr(Barrier N, Succeed) 
Pr(Barrier N, Failure) 
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Table 4.7 Final ignition likelihood estimation (developed from EN 13463-1, 2009) 
4 5 6 7 
Measures applied to prevent the ignition source becoming effective 
PSA
 
Frequency of occurrence including applied measures 
Ign
itio
n 
Lik
elih
ood
 a b c a b c d 
Description of the measure applied 
Basis (citation of standards, technical rules, experimental results) 
Technical documentation During normal operation 
During foreseeable malfunction 
During rare malfunction Not relevant 
         
 
4.1.3 Step 3: ATEX-HOF Damage Analysis   
The Damage analysis relies on the Area classification result (represented as the ID index which can be 
determined with the Table 4.9) and other factors (Table 4.8): Personnel presence (PL), Dust explosion 
index (KST), Gas explosion index (KG), Cloud volume (VZ), Layer thickness (SS), Confined Dust 
Cloud (CN). Given to the guidance of the ATEX risk assessment application (Cavaliere and 
Scardamaglia, 2005; and Cavaliere, 2011), the formulas and indexes support the calculation of the 
semi-quantitative parameter DHOF. If the zone prediction changes in the ATEX-HOF Area 
classification, the ID value is also changed as IDHOF.   
 
                              DHOF = IDHOF + PL + KST + VZ + SS + CN (for dust)                                  Eq. (4.3) 
                                   DHOF = IDHOF + PL + KG + VZ + CN (for gas)                                         Eq. (4.4) 
Table 4.8 Indexes for the D’HOF value estimation (Cavaliere, 2011) 
Factors Unit of Factors 
Indexes 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Zone NE Zone 2 or Zone 22 Zone 1 or  Zone 21 Zone 0 or Zone 20 
Personnel presence (PL) -- Absent of Work Occasional Work Intermittent Work Continuous Work 
Dust explosion index (Kst) (bar × m/s) < 10 10 to 50 51 to 100 > 100 
Gas explosion index (KG) (bar × m/s) < 10 10 to 50 51 to 100 > 100 
Cloud volume (VZ) (dm3) 0 ≤ 1 1 ≤ 10 > 10 
Layer thickness (SS) (mm) Absent ≤ 5 5 ≤ 50 > 50 
Confined Dust Cloud (CN) -- Not Expected Not Confined Partly Confined Completed Confined 
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4.1.4 Step 4: ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation  
According to Table 4.9, the values of PHOF, CHOF, and DHOF can be determined through the results from 
Step 1 to Step 3. The ATEX-HOF risk (RHOF) is the multiplication of PHOF, CHOF, and DHOF (RHOF = 
PHOF × CHOF × DHOF). Once the RHOF is calculated, relevant decision making on the safety control can 
be conducted (Table 4.10). 
                                                       RHOF = PHOF × CHOF × DHOF                                                                               Eq. (3.6) 
Table 4.9 The semi-quantitative ranking system for the ATEX-HOF risk evaluation 
Area Classification Zone 
Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Formation in 365 days (CEI 31-56, 2007) 
Semi-Quantitative Ranking System 
Degree P or PHOF C or CHOF ID or IDHOF Zone 0/20 P>10-1 Frequently 3 3 0.6 
Zone 1/21 10-1≥P>10-3 Occasionaly 2 2 0.4 
Zone 2/22 10-3≥P>10-5 Rarely 1 1 0.2 
Zone NE 10-5>P N.E. 0 0 0 
Note: 1) The IDHOF value showed in the table is based on the area classification zones and is only a part of the DHOF value calculation; 2) The DHOF value is the sum of IDHOF value and other factors showed in Table 4.8; the maximum value of DHOF for gas situation is 3, and the maximum value of DHOF for dust situation is 3.6.  
Table 4.10 ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation Criteria 
Value (RHOF) Risk Level Description Risk Control 
RHOF ≥ 18 High High likelihood of presence of explosive atmosphere. Ignition sources are present and effective. Consequences of an explosion are extermely serious. Likelihood of explosion propagation is very high. 
Risk mitigation measures must be implemented. 
9 ≤ RHOF < 18 Medium 
Likely presence of explosion atmosphere and ignition sources can be present and effective. In case of an explosions, consequences are moderate with marginal damage to personnel and process units. Explosion propagation is likely to be moderate. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a short time interval. 
1 ≤ RHOF <9 Low 
The likelihood of presence of an explosive atmosphere is extremely limited, as well as the presence of effective ignition sources. The exposure level is low, so with limited damage to persons and property. The probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered extremely limited. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a long time interval. 
RHOF ≤ 1  Negligible  
Likelihood of explosion atmosphere presence is very unlikely or ignition sources are not present or they are not effective. There are not consequences to personnel or equipment. Explosion propagation is very unlikely to occur.  
Operations should be kept monitoring in order to control the risk in this level. 
  
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 75 of 153   
4.2 Application of HRA techniques into ATEX Risk Assessment: From THERP to 
FUZZY CREAM  
 
In order to analyse the effectiveness of human interventions, the Event tree based probabilistic safety 
assessment (PSA) has been introduced in the ATEX-HOF Methodology. The initial event has an initial 
probability (PrIN/PrIG) that represents the internal explosive atmosphere occurrence (or the ignition 
source presence). A series of possible paths are constructed by applied barriers and relevant operational 
activities. Each path is assigned with a probability of failure (PrBF) or success (PrBS). A probability of a 
technical barrier failure is suggested to apply functional analysis; and the probability of operational 
failure is using Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques.  
 
Stanton et al. (2005) conducted literature review that any method discovered was recorded and added to 
the database. The result of this initial literature review was a database of over 200 HF methods and 
techniques (Table 2.4 in Chapter 2). Considering even a simple interactive system, this requires an 
examination of the links between every possible cause and every possible consequence, it is impossible 
in practice to make a deterministic analysis. The common solution is to conduct a probabilistic analysis 
for instead (Hollnagel, 1998). Human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques, as one of the important 
categories in the human factor techniques, aims to identify and quantify human error (Balfe, 2015). 
 
Evans (1976) explained that human reliability is a probability that a person correctly performs some 
system-required activities in a required time period, and performs no extraneous activity that can 
degrade the system. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a method that human reliability is estimated. 
Among the reviewed HRA techniques in Chapter 2, THERP, SPAR-H, NARA, CREAM, HEART, and 
ATHEANA can support quantitative analysis. NASA (2010) compared three HRA techniques: 1) 
THERP (the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction; Swain and Guttman, 1983), 2) CREAM 
(Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method; Hollnagel, 1998), and 3) NARA (Nuclear Action 
Reliability Assessment; Kirwan, et. al, 2005); and Nespoli & Ditali (2010) compared THERP and 
HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique; Williams, 1992). As their conclusions, 
“THERP, as one of the HRA techniques, although it is not a very recent method, was proved to be still 
valid and efficient to well represent human error rate range, if a quantitative estimate is required”. 
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In addition, SPAR-H, The Standard Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (NUREG/CR-
6883; Gertman et al., 2005), was developed as a further simplification of THERP. The basis for 
quantification of the Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) is grounded in THERP (Boring and 
Blackman, 2007). As with THERP, quantification in SPAR-H has not been validated against newer 
technology applications (Boring and Gertman, 2012). 
 
A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA; Forester et al., 2007) does not include a formal 
list of PSFs, and it uses expert estimation to generate HEPs. In practice, this approach has required 
considerable expertise and may be subject to greater inter-analyst variability than THERP (Forester et 
al., 2006).  
 
CREAM - Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (Hollnagel, 1998), covers technical, human 
and organizational factors, and provides a relatively stable Human Error Probability (HEP) output 
(Chandler, et. al, 2006). The framework is described as a Method-Classification-Model (MCM). 
CREAM has not been developed from the underlying model of cognition, but simply uses it as a 
convenient way to organize some of the categories that describe possible causes and effects in human 
actions. It was designed for different types of industries. CREAM provides two methods that can be 
used to calculate Human Error Probability (HEP): the basic method and the extended method. 
 
As mentioned above, both THERP and CREAM are applied and compared in this study, in order to 
investigate their performance on the estimation of Human Error Probability (HEP) in the on-site 
application.  
 
4.2.1 THERP Application   
4.2.1.1 Description of THERP  It is the first total approach used in the field of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) domain. It is 
designed for nuclear power plants. THERP is one of typical methods of Task-dominant type HRA 
techniques. It considers the only one dominant factor to HEP, the nominal HEP is determined once the 
task is known, and the nominal HEP can be modified by other factors (PSFs) later. THERP, although it 
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is not a very recent method, was proved to be still valid and efficient to well represent human error rate 
range, if a quantitative estimate is required (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). 
 
According to the Handbook of THERP developed by Swain and Guttmann (1983), human can be 
considered as a closed-loop system component that can receive the information from external 
environment (such as working environment, documentation materials, displays, etc.), and transfer those 
external inputs into the internal inputs of human component inside. Inside, human receives internal 
inputs via sensing, discrimination, and perceiving; then, processes internal inputs based on cognitions; 
and, responses as human outputs to system outside; finally, external results are obtained. During the 
internal inputs processing, three human behaviors would influence the performance of human: skill-
based behavior, rule-based behavior, and knowledge-based behavior. As a result, those influences may 
cause incorrect outputs as human errors considering omissions and commissions. 
 
4.2.1.2 THERP Application  
A dust cartridge filter was chosen as the case study. This case study was original from a food 
manufacturing plant. The plant produces food stabilizers, ingredients, starches and gums. The dust 
cartridge filter needs to be replaced regularly according to the frequency of use mentioned in the 
maintenance instructions. Lack or failure to replace, dust accumulation inside the filter could break 
other machines and produce internal and external explosive atmosphere.  
 
For quantifying the HEP, the basic tool of THERP is a form of event tree as human error tree. The 
branches of the human error tree represent a binary decision process which the correct or incorrect 
performance are the only choices. For each choice, HEP could be estimated by referring to the 27 
tables from the THERP handbook. Thus, the final HEP of the whole tree can be obtained based on the 
Bayesian method. 
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Step 1. Task Analysis  
Operators or maintainers are always replacing the filter in a correct way. If considering such activity 
fails with a certain probability, task analysis is applied to identify potential risks caused by human 
errors. The list of human actions is as the following:     
Relevant Steps from “Immediate Actions” to guarantee the success of doing replacement: 
Step 1. Verify the need to replace GV5 based on the frequency of use. 
Step 2. Verify if the replacement action has been done or not. 
 
Relevant Steps from “Follow-up Actions” to guarantee the success of doing replacement: 
Step 3. In case of lack of replacement, proceed with the replacement action. 
Step 3.1 Remove the cartridge cover and clean the dust. 
Step 3.2 Remove the used cartridges and replace them, reminder to connect the copper present on 
the same track. 
Step 3.3 Check the solenoid firing. 
Step 3.4 Check the cleanliness of the cabinet. 
 
Step 2. Human Error Tree Analysis  
The calculation is based on the HRA event tree (human error tree) and Bayesian method. Figure 4.5 
presents the human error tree for the Problem 1. Three branches show three human actions identified 
by the task analysis. F1, F2 and F3 represent step 1, step 2, and step 3.  
 
In the handbook, table 20-4 lists assumptions of ''number of reactor operators and advisors available to 
cope with an abnormal event and their related levels of dependence''. These assumptions enable the 
analyst to consider the effects of personnel interaction in modifying the nominal HEPs for post-event 
activities. The time interval for response of an abnormal event has four classifications:  
1) 0-1 minute: only on-duty reactor operator (RO) could response;  
2) at 1 minute, on-duty reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) could be 
involved;  
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3) at 5 minutes, on-duty reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) and shift 
supervisor (SS) could be involved;  
4) at 15 minutes, reactor operator (RO), senior reactor operator (SRO), shift supervisor (SS) and 
shift technical advisor (STA) could be involved. For each branch (each human action), the 
analyst supposes that the diagnosed time for the abnormal situation is at 15 minutes.  
 
Thus, four reactor operators and advisors should be available to cope with such abnormal event, and 
they are represented by the nodes on each branch (Table 4.11). In terms of the Bayesian method, a 
binary decision process which the correct or incorrect performance are the only choices for each node. 
Therefore, among three failure braches in the HRA event tree, two failure braches (F1 and F2) of 
immediate actions are clearly dominant. These two failure braches contribute to almost the overall 
failure probability FT, of 2.43×10-2.  
 
Figure 4.5. Human Error Tree for Problem 1 
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Table 4.11 Explanation of terms in HRA event tree for Problem 1 
Failure Node & Person Estimated HEP and Source Task Explanation 
A1 0.1 RO failed to correctly diagnose the need to replace the filter based on the frequency. A2 0.55 SRO failed to correctly diagnose the need to replace the filter based on the frequency. A3 0.23 SS failed to correctly diagnose the need to replace the filter based on the frequency. A4 1 STA failed to correctly diagnose the need to replace the filter based on the frequency. B1 0.1 RO failed to verify if the replacement action has been done or not. B2 0.55 SRO failed to correct RO’s error. B3 0.23 SS failed to correct RO’s error. B4 1 STA would not be involved in this procedural detail. C1 0.05 RO failed to do replacement action step by step correctly. C2 0.53 SRO failed to correct RO’s error. C3 0.19 SS failed to correct RO’s error. C4 0.05 STA failed to start some mitigation measures for responding RO, SRO, and SS’s error.  
4.2.2 FUZZY CREAM Application  
4.2.2.1 Description of CREAM  
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) is the representative of cognition-dominant 
HRA methods which was developed. CREAM is a generic term, and includes environment, task 
characteristics, operator and plant, etc. It considers interactions between person-related, technology-
related, and organization-related factors; and provides a relatively stable HEP output; also, it was 
designed for different types of industries (Chandler, et. al, 2006).  
 
The framework is described as a Method-Classification-Model (MCM). CREAM has not been 
developed from the underlying model of cognition, but simply uses it as a convenient way to organize 
some of the categories that describe possible causes and effects in human actions (Hollnagel, 1998). 
The model is to define the relationship between components of the classification scheme. It is the way 
in which erroneous actions may come about. The modelling of cognition applied in CREAM is model 
macro-cognition and is based on the Contextual Control Model (COCOM, Hollnagel, 1998). The 
classification scheme in CREAM is not a hierarchy of class and subclasses. The highest level of the 
CREAM classification scheme makes a distinction between effects (phenotypes) and causes 
(genotypes). The effects (phenotypes) refer to what is observable in the given system.  
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The causes (genotypes) are the categories to describe which can bring about the effect(s). There are 
three categories of genotypes: the first category is associated with human psychological characteristics; 
the second category is associated with the technological system; and the third category is associated 
with the characteristics of organization, the work environment and the interaction between people.  
 
Instead of the classification scheme, CREAM also provide Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) 
as performance shaping factors (PSFs), and provides a two-level method to calculate Human Error 
Probability (HEP): the basic method and the extended method (Figure 4.6). Science unpredictable and 
uncontrolled variability may become part of the causes of incidents and accidents, HRA has naturally 
been concerned with the variability of human performance. The result of assessing CPCs can be used 
as the basis for determining the probable genotypes (causes).  
 
 
Figure 4.6 CREAM-basic and extended methods (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
The basic method uses task analysis to identify human actions, and assesses the Common Performance 
Conditions (CPCs, Table 4.12) by judging the expected effects and making a total or combined score of 
them with the triplet [reduced, not significant, improved]. Final results are interpreted through the 
Contextual Control Mode (COCOM) Model: a) Strategic Control, the person considers the global 
context, thus using a wider time horizon and looking ahead at higher level goals. b) Tactical Control, 
performance is based on planning, hence more or less follows a known procedure or rule. c) 
Opportunistic Control, the next action is determined by the salient features of the current context rather 
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than on more stable intentions or goals. d) Scrambled Control, the choice of next action is in practice 
unpredictable or haphazard (Figure 4.7).  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Relations between CPC score and control modes (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
The COCOM model not only defined the control modes, but also provided HEP probability ranges 
(Table 4.13). If the basic method is not sufficient, CREAM provides the extended method to produce 
specific action failure probabilities (Hollnagel, 1998). 
 
Table 4.13 Control modes with the logarithm format as Fuzzy output sets (Hollnagel, 1998) 
Human Error Probability (HEP) 
UOD Number of Fuzzy Sets Level/ Descriptors HEP Ranges 
Membership Level Intervals (Logarithm Format) 
[0,1] 4 
Strategic 0.5 ×10-5˂ P ˂ 1.0 ×10-2 -5.3 to -2.3 
Tactical 1.0 ×10-3˂ P ˂ 1.0 ×10-1 -3.3 to -1.3 
Opportunistic 1.0 ×10-2˂ P ˂ 0.5 -2.3 to -0.3 
Scrambled 1.0 ×10-1˂ P ˂ 1.0 -1.3 to 0 
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Table 4.12 Common Performance Conditions (Hollnagel, 1998) 
CPCs Level Effect Descriptors 
Adequacy of Organization 
Very Efficient Improved The quality of the roles and responsibilities of team members, additional support, communication systems, Safety Management System, instructions and guidelines for externally oriented activities, role of external agencies, etc. 
Efficient Not significant 
Inefficient Reduced 
Deficient Reduced 
Working Conditions 
Advantageous Improved The nature of the physical working conditions such as ambient lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms, interruptions from the task, etc. Compatible Not significant Incompatible Reduced Adequacy of MMI and Operational Support 
Supportive Improved The Man-Machine Interface in general, including the information available on control panels, computerised workstations, and operational support provided by specifically designed decision aids. 
Adequate Not significant Tolerable Not significant Inappropriate Reduced Availability of Procedures / Plans 
Appropriate Improved Procedures and plans include operating and emergency procedures, familiar patterns of response heuristics, routines, etc. Acceptable Not significant Inappropriate Reduced 
Number of Simultaneous Goals 
Fewer than capacity Not significant The number of tasks a person is required to pursue or attend to at the same time. Matching current capacity Not significant More than capacity Reduced 
Available Time 
Adequate Improved The time available to carry out a task and corresponds to how well the task execution is synchronised to the process dynamics. 
Temporarily inadequate Not significant Continuously inadequate Reduced 
Time of Day (Circadian Rhythm) 
Night-time, (unadjusted) Reduced The time of day (or night) describes the time at which the task is carried out, in particular whether or not the person is adjusted to the current time (circadian rhythm). Typical examples are the effects of shift work. It is a well-established fact that the time of day has an effect on the quality of work, and that performance is less efficient if the normal circadian rhythm is disrupted. 
Day-time, (adjusted) Not significant 
Night-time, (unadjusted) Reduced 
Adequacy of Training and Experience 
Adequate, High Experience Improved The level and quality of training provided to operators as familiarisation to new technology, refreshing old skills, etc. It also refers to the level of operational experience. 
Adequate, Limited Experience Not significant 
Inadequate Reduced 
Crew Collaboration Quality 
Very efficient Improved The quality of the collaboration between crew members, including the overlap between the official and unofficial structure, the level of trust, and the general social climate among crew members. 
Efficient Not significant Inefficient Not significant Deficient Reduced 
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4.2.2.2 FUZZY CREAM  
Starting from CREAM basic method, Konstandinidou et al. (2006) introduced FUZZY CREAM as a 
complementary methodology to assess the HEP. For this study, a dedicated tool was developed to 
apply FUZZY CREAM, based on both contributions from Konstandinidou et al. (2006) and Monferini 
et al. (2013). Meanwhile, the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox in Matlab® was used for the result validation. 
 
Step 1 – Fuzzification 
Fuzzy logic starts with the concept of a fuzzy set. In practice, if X is the universe of discourse and its 
elements are denoted by x, then a fuzzy set A in X is defined as a set of ordered pairs. 
A = {x, μA(x) | x X} 
μA(x) is called the membership function (or MF) of x in A. The membership function maps each 
element of X to a membership value between 0 and 1. In this FUZZY CREAM tool, triangular 
membership function was used as straight lines to describe the distributions of each level of a fuzzy 
input set. The 9 CREAM CPCs mentioned were used to build the input fuzzy sets (Table 4.14 and 
Figure 4.8) and also the output fuzzy sets were derived from the four control modes provided by 
COCOM (Table 4.13).  
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                               CPC 1. Adequacy of Organization                                CPC 2. Working Conditions 
 
CPC 3. Adequacy of MMI and Operational Support        CPC 4. Availability of Procedures/Plans 
 
                           CPC 5. Number of Simultaneous Goals                                CPC 6. Available Time 
 
                 CPC 7. Time of the Day                         CPC 8. Adequacy of Training and Experience 
 
CPC 9. Crew Collaboration Quality          Output: Human Error Probability (Logarithm Format) 
 
Figure 4.8 FUZZY Sets of Nice CPC Inputs and Control Mode Output 
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Table 4.14 CPCs in CREAM as FUZZY input sets (Konstandinidou et al., 2006, & Monferini et al., 2013) 
Inputs Range Fuzzy Sets Level/Descriptors Effect Membership Level Intervals 
CPC
 1 Adequacy of Organization [0,100] 4 
Very Efficient Improved MF1 70-100 Efficient Not significant MF2 40-90 Inefficient Reduced MF3 10-60 Deficient Reduced MF4 0-25 
CPC
 2 Working Conditions [0,100] 3 
Advantageous Improved MF1 70-100 
Compatible Not significant MF2 20-80 
Incompatible Reduced MF3 0-30 
CPC
 3 Adequacy of MMI and Operational Support 
[0,100] 4 
Supportive Improved MF1 70-100 Adequate Not significant MF2 40-90 Tolerable Not significant MF3 10-60 Inappropriate Reduced MF4 0-25 
CPC
 4 Availability of Procedures / Plans [0,100] 3 
Appropriate Improved MF1 70-100 
Acceptable Not significant MF2 20-80 Inappropriate Reduced MF3 0-30 
CPC
 5 Number of Simultaneous Goals [0,100] 3 
Fewer than capacity Not significant MF1 70-100 Matching current capacity Not significant MF2 20-80 More than capacity Reduced MF3 0-30 
CPC
 6 Available Time [0,100] 3 
Adequate Improved MF1 70-100 Temporarily inadequate Not significant MF2 20-80 Continuously inadequate Reduced MF3 0-30 
CPC
 7 Time of Day (Circadian Rhythm) [0,24] 3 
Night-time Reduced MF1 16-24 
Day-time Not significant MF2 8-17 
Night-time Reduced MF3 0-9 
CPC
 8 Adequacy of Training and Experience [0,100] 3 
Adequate, High Experience Improved MF1 70-100 Adequate, Limited Experience Not significant MF2 20-80 Inadequate Reduced MF3 0-30 
CPC
 9 Crew Collaboration Quality [0,100] 4 
Very efficient Improved MF1 70-100 
Efficient Not significant MF2 40-90 
Inefficient Not significant MF3 10-60 
Deficient Reduced MF4 0-25 
 
Step 2 -  Fuzzy inference 
Fuzzy inference is a method that interprets the values in the input vector and, based on some set of 
rules, assigns values to the output vector. The primary mechanism is doing a list of “if-then” rules. 
Since in fuzzy logic the truth of any statement is a matter of degree, min-max operations are applied to 
resolve the statement. In FUZZY CREAM, the rules are constructed in simple linguistic terms and 
Mamdani's fuzzy inference method is applied. Furthermore, 46656 rules are generated. Here the first 
rule is presented as an example:  
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“IF Adequacy of Organization is very efficient, AND  
Working Conditions is advantageous, AND  
Adequacy of MMI and Operational Support is supportive, AND  
Availability of Procedures / Plans is appropriate, AND  
Number of Simultaneous Goals is fewer than capacity, AND  
Available Time is adequate, AND  
Time of Day (Circadian Rhythm) is unadjusted Night-time, AND  
Adequacy of Training and Experience is adequate with high experience, AND  
Crew Collaboration Quality is very efficient, THEN  
output is Strategic control mode.” 
 
Step 3 – Defuzzification 
Defuzzification transforms the final aggregated output fuzzy sets into a single numerical value; the 
developed FUZZY CREAM tool adopted Centroid method for it. The output from Step 2 composes an 
aggregated area; Centroid defuzzification allows to return the center of area under the curve, which is 
the HEP. 
 
Step 4 -Validation of Results by Matlab® 
Fuzzy logic toolbox in Matlab® provides an alternative way to gain HEP from FUZZY CREAM. It was 
used to validate the result derived from FUZZY CREAM tool application.  
 
4.2.2.3 Application of FUZZY CREAM  
FUZZY CREAM tool was applied to the same case study from a food manufacturing company. The 
dust cartridge filter needs to be regularly replaced, depending on the frequency of use. Lacking or 
failure of the replacement procedure can cause a dust surplus inside the filter that could break and 
produce external explosive atmospheres. FUZZY CREAM tool was applied to estimate the Human 
Error Probability (HEP). The 9 CPCs values were estimated by safety experts and contribute the input 
vector for FUZZY CREAM application. The HEP output obtained for the case study was 1.58×10-2. 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
 The dust cartridge filter case study was firstly subjected to THERP application (Geng et al., 2014), and 
then to FUZZY CREAM. The improvements led by the second method are hereinafter explained. 
 
4.2.3.1 Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)  
THERP identifies Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) that influence HEP, but it doesn’t precisely 
define the rules (only 3 PSFs are involved in the calculation) for their application. On the contrary, 
CREAM is able to consider technical, human and organizational factors, and it gives very detailed 
indications on how to treat Common Performance Conditions (CREAM CPCs are the equivalent to 
THERP PSFs).  
 
4.2.3.2 Application complexity 
 THERP requires the compiling of many tables, which need a professional background in HOF. The two 
levels approach provided by CREAM allows users to choose the basic method for HEP calculation, 
which is very easy to apply. Also, FUZZY CREAM tool can be easily handled by the general safety 
specialists, after a short training period. 
 
4.2.3.3 Time consuming  HEP calculation in THERP needs more time, because of the tables compiling. On the contrary, the 
developed FUZZY CREAM tool permits to spare time, because it only requires to safety specialists to 
assign a judgment to the CPCs; then HEP output is generated by the tool itself. 
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Chapter 5. Application of the ATEX-HOF Methodology in a Food 
Industry  
 
5.1 Description of the Case Study  
This case study was original from a food manufacturing plant. The plant produces food stabilizers, 
ingredients, starches and gums. The traditional ATEX risk assessment identified 44 emission sources; 
among them, a dust cartridge filter was chosen as a case study, which needs to be replaced regularly, 
according to the frequency of use mentioned in the maintenance instructions. Lack or failure to replace, 
dust accumulation inside the filter could break other machines and produce internal and external 
explosive atmosphere.  
 
5.2 Step 1: ATEX-HOF Area classification  
 
Since the identified flammable substances lead to the explosive dust atmosphere formation, the IEC 
60079-10-2 (for dust, 2009) and CEI 31-56 (2007) were applied. 
 
Step 1-1: Identification of Emission Sources  
Each item of the process equipment which contains flammable materials is considered as a potential 
release source. 
Table 5.1 Emission sources identification 
Emission Sources Internal Sources of Release External Sources of Release 
A dust cartridge filter Dust inside the filter Dust leakage because of the filter replacement during maintenance activities  
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Step 1-2: Determining the internal zone   
The degree of the ventilation was “Low” inside of the filter, and the availability was “Good”. The 
release grade of the inside clean side was “secondary”; and the release grade of the inside dirty side 
was “continuous”. Hence, the internal zone was determined (Table 5.2):  
Table 5.2 Internal Zone Determination  
Emission Sources Internal Sources of Release Grade of Release Ventilation Internal Zone Type Degree Availability A dust cartridge filter 
Dust inside the filter (dirty side) Continuous Artificial Low Good Zone 20 
Dust inside the filter (clean side) Secondary Artificial Low Good Zone 22 
 
Step 1-3: Determining the external zone  The degree of the ventilation was “Medium” outside of the filter, and the availability was “Good”. The 
external release grade was “secondary”. The initial external zone was determined as Zone 22.  
 
Since the release and the spreading of the flammable substances can be influenced by applied barriers 
and other human interventions. In the case study, the maintainer conducting the maintenance activities 
has been considered. The Human Error Probability (HEP) were estimated by applying FUZZY 
CREAM (Table 5.3):  
Table 5.3 HEP estimation  
Relevant Human Intervention CPC 1 CPC 2 CPC 3 CPC 4 CPC 5 CPC 6 CPC 7 CPC 8 CPC 9 HEP 
Maintainer 70 65 20 65 25 50 16 60 10 1.58×10-2 
 
The Event tree here was built. The initial event has an initial probability (PrIN) that represents the 
internal explosive atmosphere occurrence. A series of possible paths are constructed by applied barriers 
or other relevant operational activities. Each path is assigned with a probability of the failure (PrBF) or 
success (PrBS). The probability allows to calculate the likelihood of having an initial/additional 
explosive atmosphere.  
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External Source of Release 1): Dust leakage because of the filter replacement during maintenance activities 
 
      
 Figure 5.1 Event tree analysis for the release source – dust leakage 
Table 5.4 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure Final External Zone Determination 
0.001 (Zone 22) 1.58E-02 (Zone 21, dirty side) Zone 21 1.58E-05 (Zone 22, clean side) 
 
Conclusion: In case of the operational failure (dirty side), the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is 
higher than the initial external zone. Thus, this is not a sufficient safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence 
leading to have additional explosive atmosphere. The most influential failure is result from maintainer's activities. 
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Step 1-4: Results of the ATEX-HOF Area classification  
Table 5.5 shows the area classification results from both internal and external sides of the dust cartridge 
filter. Further, with the sum of all external zones, the envelop of the external zones were drawn on the 
layout to understand the critical area. The final analysis was completed.  
Table 5.5 ATEX-HOF Area classification result  
 
5.3 Step 2: ATEX-HOF Ignition Source Assessment 
 Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as 
dangerous zone. Potential ignition sources are identified based on 13 possible ignition sources listed in 
EN 1127-1 (Table 4.4). Once the presence of the ignition source is identified, the frequency of 
occurrence will be assessed (EN 13463-1, 2009): 1) occurrence during normal operation; 2) occurrence 
during foreseeable malfunction; 3) occurrence during rare malfunction; 4) not relevant.  
 
It is known that one has to supply initial ignition energy to initiate combustion process. A flammable 
mixture air can be ignited by an external source of energy such as electric spark, a naked flame, hot 
vessel walls, etc. It is possible to ignite any flammable mixture only when the maximum generated 
energy is enough to ignite the mixture (above the minimum ignition energy, MIE).  
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In case that identified potential ignition source is effective, applied barriers and relevant human 
interventions should be considered. The Event tree has been built. There is one technical barrier 
applied: the ground system. As the provided technical document: Ptbf = 3.83×10-4. The relevant 
operational activities are conducted by the maintainer. According to the general working context and 
the personal working performances, the HEP were estimated by applying FUZZY CREAM: HEP 
(maintainer) =1.58×10-2. Therefore, the ignition source assessment (during conducting the replacement 
relevant maintenance activities) were conducted. The final ignition likelihood is assessed in the 
conservative way. The maximum value of the ignition likelihood among all identified potential ignition 
sources will be chosen as the final result. 
Table 5.6 ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment (Internal assessment result: Rarely) 
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Table 5.7 ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment (External assessment result: Rarely) 
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5.4 Step 3: ATEX-HOF Damage Analysis   
ATEX-HOF damage analysis relies on the Area classification result and other factors. Given to the 
guidance of the ATEX risk assessment application (Cavaliere and Scardamaglia, 2005; and Cavaliere, 
2011), the formulas and indexes support the calculation of the semi-quantitative parameter DHOF. If the 
zone prediction changes in the ATEX-HOF Area classification, the ID value is also changed as IDHOF.   
 
                              DHOF = IDHOF + PL + KST + VZ + SS + CN (for dust)                                  Eq. (5.1) 
 
5.5 Step 4: ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation  
According to Table 4.9 of Chapter 4, the values of PHOF, CHOF, and DHOF can be determined through the 
results from Step 1 to Step 3. The ATEX-HOF risk (RHOF) was the multiplication of PHOF, CHOF, and 
DHOF (RHOF = PHOF×CHOF×DHOF), and the final risk level can be ranked.  
Table 5.8 Traditional ATEX Risk evaluation result for the basic paint mixing unit (in case of relevant operational activities and applied barriers success) 
Emission Source Area Classification P Effectiveness of Ignition Source C D R = P×C×D Risk Level 
A dust cartridge filter 
Dust inside the filter (dirty side) 3 Internal:  Not relevant 0 3.6 R<1 Negligible Dust inside the filter (clean side) 1 External:  Not relevant 
0 1.2 R<1 Negligible 
External (leakage) 1 0 1.2 R<1 Negligible 
 
Table 5.9 Traditional ATEX Risk evaluation result for the basic paint mixing unit (in case of relevant operational activities and applied barriers failure) 
Emission Source Area Classification PHOF Effectiveness of Ignition Source CHOF DHOF RHOF = PHOF×CHOF×DHOF Risk Level 
A dust cartridge filter 
Dust inside the filter (dirty side) 3 Internal:  Rarely 1 3.6 10.8 Medium Dust inside the filter (clean side) 1 External:  Rarely 
1 1.2 1.2 Low 
External (leakage) 2 1 2.4 4.8 Low 
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5.6 Results for the ATEX-HOF Risk Assessment  
 
As mentioned above, the risk level of the basic paint mixing unit is NEGLIGIBLE for the dust 
cartridge filter (internal and external sides) in case of the maintainer conducting the correct replacement 
relevant maintenance activities. 
 
In case of fail to conduct the replacement relevant maintenance activities, the risk level goes up to the 
MEDIUM level inside the dirty side; and LOW level inside the clean side of the dust cartridge filter 
and the same as the outside of the filter. Risk mitigation measures should be implemented according to 
the Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation Criteria 
Value (RHOF) Risk Level Description Risk Control 
RHOF ≥ 18 High High likelihood of presence of explosive atmosphere. Ignition sources are present and effective. Consequences of an explosion are extermely serious. Likelihood of explosion propagation is very high. 
Risk mitigation measures must be implemented. 
9 ≤ RHOF < 18 Medium 
Likely presence of explosion atmosphere and ignition sources can be present and effective. In case of an explosions, consequences are moderate with marginal damage to personnel and process units. Explosion propagation is likely to be moderate. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a short time interval. 
1 ≤ RHOF <9 Low 
The likelihood of presence of an explosive atmosphere is extremely limited, as well as the presence of effective ignition sources. The exposure level is low, so with limited damage to persons and property. The probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered extremely limited. 
Risk mitigation measures should be implemented in a long time interval. 
RHOF ≤ 1  Negligible  
Likelihood of explosion atmosphere presence is very unlikely or ignition sources are not present or they are not effective. There are not consequences to personnel or equipment. Explosion propagation is very unlikely to occur.  
Operations should be kept monitoring in order to control the risk in this level. 
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Chapter 6. Application of the ATEX-HOF Methodology in an 
Automotive Manufacturing Industry  
 
ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment is required when any equipment or system potentially 
cause explosive atmospheres. Cavaliere and Scardamaglia (2005) and Cavaliere (2011) provided a 
methodology for the ATEX risk assessment that fulfills the requirements of both ATEX Directive 
94/9/EC and related standards. However, when reviewing the ATEX risk assessment procedures, 
despite many operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous substances are performed by 
operators, the influence of human and organizational factors (HOF) are neglected (e.g. maintenance 
activity). The ATEX-HOF methodology is proposed based on the traditional methodology, with the 
aim of providing an advanced methodology to analyze HOF influences on ATEX hazards.  
 
In Chapter 5, a case study that deals with explosive dust atmospheres was applied. In Chapter 6, 
another case study under the explosive gas atmospheres situation is applied, in order to investigate the 
applicability of the ATEX-HOF Methodology in various industrial environment. 
 
6.1 Description of the Case Study 
 
The case study was originally taken from the Central paint mixing station in an automotive 
manufacturing plant. Paint application is one of the most important automobile manufacturing 
processes. Not only does the paint coating protect the body surface, it also enhances visual appeal. For 
the use of primer, coat, paints, and solvents, materials contain flammable substances that potentially 
cause risks to have explosive gas atmospheres. Ten groups of emission sources were identified which 
were separated in different rooms of the Central paint mixing station: Storage room, Solvent mixing 
room, and Paint mixing room. Inside the paint mixing room, the basic paint mixing unit (Figure 6.1) 
was selected as a case study to apply the ATEX-HOF methodology.  
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Figure 6.1 Layout and the Photo of One Paint Mixing Unit 
 
Operation Principles: 
 
The basic paint mixing unit has a double tank for the preparation and pumping high consumption paint. 
The 1000 lt container with the product provided by the supplier of the product is positioned on the 
relative support close to the group. The flexible suction tube is connected and, through use of the 
transfer pump, the product is transferred to the preparation tank.  
 
In the preparation tank it is adequately diluted by adding dilution solvent, checking the quantity using 
the manual litre counter. The product is mixed using the electric shaker fitted on the cover. The product 
created in this way is transferred to the working tank through the membrane pump for transfer, 
therefore making the preparation tank ready for a new preparation cycle. The electric pump powers the 
distribution circuit keeping the product in re-circulation. The pressure in the re-circulation circuit is 
controlled and maintained by means of a return regulator. A signal generated by the supervision system 
informs the operator that the minimum level set in the working tank that manually operates on the 
valves to select the circuit that allows the transfer pump to transfer the product from the preparation 
tank to the working tank, has been reached.  
 
The management group and the loading of products is completely manual. The operator is responsible 
for controlling these operations acting on the panel of selectors and the QP control flow meter. 
 
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 101 of 153   
The station is staffed by three daily shifts. Each shift (8 hours per day) mainly has one shift leader, two 
operators, and one daily maintainer. Paint mixing operation is 365-day operation. Paint mixing 
operation is one-by-one operation. Two simultaneous mixing operations are prohibited.  
 
6.2 Step 1: ATEX-HOF Area Classification  
The ATEX Area classification deals with situations of normal operation, maintenance, and predictable 
failures. Inside the basic paint mixing unit, there are different flammable substances in a mixture. As 
reported the results are those related to more critical substances, the explosive gas atmosphere may be 
potentially caused by flammable liquid, gas and vapours. The general procedures mainly refers to the 
standard IEC 60079-10-1 (2010) the Italian guideline CEI 31-35 (2012), which are summarized as: 
- Step 1-1: General on-site information, flammable substance and emission source identification 
- Step 1-2: Determining the area classification inside the equipment 
- Step 1-3: Determining the area classification outside the equipment 
- Step 1-4: Area classification results  
 
Step 1-1: General information, flammable substances, and source of release identification  
 
The general on-site information: 
Location: Indoor Situation 
Ventilation Condition: General Artificial Ventilation (GAV) 
Atmospheric Pressure: 1013 mbar 
Maximum Outdoor Temperature in summer: 35°C 
Maximum Indoor Temperature: 21-25°C  
Total Max Air Flow: 120000 (m3/h) 
The Area of the Building: 1123.61 (m2) 
The Building Size (V0): 6685.48 (m3) 
 
The critical flammable substances from each collected safety data sheet (applied paints) are identified 
in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 Important Parameters of the Identified Flammable Substances 
Composition Flash Point (噛C) 
LEL Molar Mass M (kg/kmol) 
Coefficience of diffusion cd 
Vapour Pressure at 20°C, Pv (Pa) 
Density of Liquid ρliq (kg/m3) 
Relative Density Gas/Air 
Auto Ignition Temp. (噛C) 
Temprature Class Equipment Group g/m3 vol. % 
naphtha <0 -- 1,1 114 0,060 827 760 -- -- -- -- 
butanone -10 45 1,8 72,1 0,031 1058 800 2,48 404 T2 IIA 
heptane -7 35 0,85 100,2 0,025 10653 684 3,46 204 T3 IIA 
toluene 4 39 1,1 92,14 0,028 1830 866 3,18 480 T1 IIA 
propan-2-ol 12 50 2 60,09 0,036 4201 789 2,1 400 T2 IIA 
ethylbenzene 15 44 0,8 106,17 0,024 931 867 3,66 431 T2 IIA 
4-methylpentan-2-one 16 50 1,2 100,2 0,026 2128 802 3,45 475 T1 IIA 
n-butyl acetate 22 58 1,7 116,16 0,024 1064 882 4,01 390 T2 IIA 
2-methylpropan-1-ol 28 43 1,4 74,12 0,031 1232 805 2,55 408 T2 IIA 
 
Each item of the process equipment which contains flammable materials is considered as a potential 
release source. Table 6.2 summarizes identified emission sources. 
Table 6.2 Emission sources identification for the basic paint mixing unit 
Emission Sources Quantity Internal Sources of Release External Sources of Release Paint Loading Container 
1000L. Paint Loading Container 1 Liquid surface within the paint loading container  
1) Openings in the loading container; 2) Leakage of liquid close to the loading container. Fixed Process Mixing Vessels 
2000 L. Fixed Process Mixing Vessel 2 Liquid surface within the mixing vessel 
1) Vent openings and other openings in the mixing vessel. 2) Spillage or leakage of liquid close to the mixing vessel. 
Supply System 
Filter S.S. 20” 1 
Liquid surface within the supply system 
1) Structural emission from connectors and gaskets. 2) Leakage from seals, flanges, pipe fittings, and other connectors in case of failure. 
Filter S.S. PN-16 10” 2 Electric Pump 2 Pneumatic Diaphragm Pump 1 Valves 62 Hoses 3 
 
Step 1-2: Determining the area classification inside the equipment 
 
The type of the area classification inside the equipment (the internal zone) can be referred to the grade 
of release and the ventilation conditions. It is generally conducted in a qualitative way. Three levels of 
the grade of releases are mentioned in IEC 60079-10-1 (2008): 1) a continuous grade of release, 2) a 
primary grade of release, and 3) a secondary grade of release. Further, the flammable substances 
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released into the atmosphere can be diluted by dispersion or diffusion into the air until its concentration 
is below the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Ventilation helps promoting dispersion, and Table 4.1 
shows the influence of the ventilation on determining the type of zone. The effectiveness of the 
ventilation will depend upon the degree (High, Medium, Low) and availability (Good, Fair, Poor) of 
ventilation and the design of the system. Hence, the internal zone for each identified emission source 
was determined (Table 6.3): 
Table 6.3 Internal Zone Determination for the Basic Paint Mixing Unit 
Emission Sources Quantity Internal Sources of Release Grade of Release 
Ventilation Internal Zone Type Degree Availability 
1000L. Paint Loading Container 1 Liquid surface within the paint loading container Continuous Artificial Low Poor Zone 0 
2000 L. Fixed Process Mixing Vessel 2 Liquid surface within the mixing vessel Continuous Artificial Low Good Zone 0 
Supply System 
Filter S.S. 20” 1 
Liquid surface within the supply system Continuous Artificial Low Good Zone 0 
Filter S.S. PN-16 10” 2 Electric Pump 2 Pneumatic Diaphragm Pump 1 Valves 62 Hoses 3   Step 1-3: Determining the area classification outside the equipment  
 
1) Initial External Zone Determination 
 
Determining the area classification outside the equipment (the external zone) is based on the release 
rate, LEL, ventilation and other factors (e.g. climatic conditions, etc.). The external zone depends on 
the estimated area over which the explosive atmosphere insists before it disperses.  
 
The ventilation condition is relied on the type, degree, and availability of the ventilation. In the central 
paint mixing station, the type of the ventilation is the general artificial ventilation. The degree is 
estimated by calculating the hypothetical volume Vz with Formula B4 and Formula B3 (Annex B.5.2.2 
CEI EN 60079-10-1, Indoor situation): 
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where, 
- Vz: Hypothetical volume of potentially explosive atmosphere including safety coefficient k (m3); 
- f: Efficiency of ventilation in terms of its effectiveness in diluting the explosive gas atmosphere, whit f 
ranging from f=1 (ideal solution) to, typically f=5 (impeded air flow); 
- Vk: Hypothetical volume of potentially explosive atmosphere in the presumption of an instantaneous and 
homogeneous mixture with air near the source, under ideal conditions the fresh air flow (f = 1) (m3); 
- (dV/dt)min is the minimum volumetric flow rate of fresh air (volume per time, m3/s); 
- C: Number of fresh air changes per unit time (s-1); 
- (dV0/dt): Total flow rate of fresh air through the volume under consideration; 
- V0: Entire volume (within the control of the plant) served by actual ventilation in the vicinity of release 
being considered. 
 
To ascertain the hypothetical volume Vz, it is necessary to first establish the theoretical minimum 
ventilation flow rate of fresh air (dV/dt)min to dilute a given release of flammable material to the 
required concentration below the lower explosive limit. This can be calculated by means of the 
Formula B1 (Annex B.5.2.2 CEI EN 60079-10-1): 
 
 
   
where, 
- (dV/dt)min is the minimum volumetric flow rate of fresh air (volume per time, m3/s); 
- (dG/dt)max is the maximum rate of release at source (mass per time, kg/s); 
- LELm is the lower explosive limit (mass per volume, kg/m3); 
- k is a safety factor applied to the LELm; typically: 
        k = 0,25 (continuous and primary grades of release) 
        k = 0,5 (secondary grades of release); 
- T is the ambient temperature (in Kelvin, K). 
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As a result, given to the calculation of the hypothetical volume Vz and other parameters, the ventilation 
conditions are determined. With the identified grade of release and the ventilation condition, the initial 
external zone for each emission source was determined (Table 6.4). Figure 6.2 shows an example of the 
way to determine the external zone via the event tree.   
Table6.4 Initial External Zone Determination for the Basic Paint Mixing Unit 
Emission Sources Quantity External Sources of Release Grade of Release 
Ventilation Initial External Zone Type Degree Availability 
1000L. Paint Loading Container 1 
1) Openings in the loading container; Primary Artificial Medium Good Zone 1 2) Leakage of liquid close to the loading container. Secondary Artificial Medium Good Zone 2 
2000 L. Fixed Process Mixing Vessel 2 
1) Vent openings and other openings in the mixing vessel. Primary Artificial Medium Good Zone 1 2) Spillage or leakage of liquid close to the mixing vessel. Secondary Artificial Medium Good Zone 2 
Supply System 
Filter S.S. 20” 1 1) Structural emission from connectors and gaskets. Primary Artificial Medium Good Zone 1 Filter S.S. PN-16 10” 2 Electric Pump 2 Pneumatic Diaphragm Pump 1 2) Leakage from seals, flanges, pipe fittings, and other connectors in case of failure. 
Secondary Artificial Medium Good Zone 2 Valves 62 Hoses 3  
2) Calculation: Failure Probability of Applied Barriers and/or other Operational Activities  
 
The release and the spreading of the flammable substances can be influenced by applied barriers 
(technical barriers, e.g. grounding system; operational barriers, e.g. maintaining activities), and other 
human interventions. In the case study, the operational barriers and other relevant operational activities 
are conducted by two people: a) one is the operator performing daily tasks in a normal operation 
condition (Scenario 1); and b) another is the maintainer conducting the maintenance activities 
(Scenario 2). The Human Error Probability (HEP) were estimated (Table 6.5):  
Table 6.5 HEP estimation for scenario 1 (sc.1) and scenario 2 (sc.2) by applying FUZZY CREAM 
Sc. CPC 1 CPC 2 CPC 3 CPC 4 CPC 5 CPC 6 CPC 7 CPC 8 CPC 9 HEP 
Sc. 1 80 70 70 80 70 70 14 75 70 5.01×10-3 
Sc. 2 70 65 20 65 25 50 16 60 10 1.58×10-2 
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Figure 6.2 Example of Initial External Zone Determination – Openings in the fixed mixing vessel  
 
3) Event tree analysis and the Final External Zone Determination 
 
The Event tree (Papazoglou, 1998) is here introduced for a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The 
initial event has an initial probability (PrIN) that represents the internal explosive atmosphere 
occurrence. A series of possible paths are constructed by applied barriers or other relevant operational 
activities. Each path is assigned with a probability of the failure (PrBF) or success (PrBS). The 
probability allows to calculate the likelihood of having an initial/additional explosive atmosphere.  
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External Source of Release 2): Openings in the fixed mixing vessel 
 
Figure 6.4 Event tree analysis for the release source – openings in the fixed mixing vessel 
Table 6.7 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure Final External Zone Determination 
0,1 (Zone 1) 5,010E-03 (Zone 1) Zone 1 
 Conclusion: Even in case of the relevant operational failure, the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is less than (or within the range of) the initial external zone (Table 6.7). Thus, this is a good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial external zone. 
External Source of Release 1): Openings in the loading container 
 
Figure 6.3 Event tree analysis for the release source – opening in the loading container 
Table 6.6 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure Final External Zone Determination 
0,1 (Zone 1) 5,010E-03 (Zone 1) Zone 1 
Conclusion: Even in case of the relevant operational failure, the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is less than (or within the range of) the initial external zone (Table 6.6). Thus, this is a good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial external zone. 
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External Source of Release 3): Structural Emission from the Supply System 
   
Figure 6.5 Event tree analysis for the release source – Structural emission from the supply system 
Table 6.8 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure Final External Zone Determination 
0,1 (Zone 1) 1,580E-02 (Zone 1) Zone 1 
Conclusion: Even in case of the relevant operational failure, the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is less than (or within the range of) the initial external zone (Table 6.8). Thus, this is a good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial external zone. 
  External Source of Release 4): Spillage, Leakage in case of Failure (for the paint loading container) 
 
     Figure 6.6 Event tree analysis for the release source – Spillage, leakage in case of failure 
Table 6.9 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure Final External Zone Determination 
0,001 (Zone 2) 5,01E-06 (Zone N.E.) Zone 2 
 Conclusion: Even in case of the relevant operational failure, the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is less than (or within the range of) the initial external zone (Table 6.9). Thus, this is a good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial external zone. 
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    Step 1-4: Results of the ATEX-HOF Area classification  
Table 6.11 shows the area classification result from both internal and external sides of the basic paint 
mixing unit. Further, with the sum of all external zones, the envelop of the external zones were drawn 
on the layout to understand the critical area (Figure 6.8). The final analysis was completed.  
 
  External Source of Release 5): Spillage, Leakage in case of Failure (for the mixing vessel and the supply system) 
      
Figure 6.7 Event tree analysis for the release source – Spillage, leakage in case of failure 
Table 6.10 Final External Zone Determination  
Initial External Zone Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere in case of the operational failure (B+C+D) Final External Zone Determination 
0,001 (Zone 2) 2,073E-02 (Zone 1) Zone 1 
 Conclusion: In case of barrier failure and other operational failure, the probability to have additional explosive atmosphere generated is 
higher than the initial external zone. Thus, this is not a sufficient safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence leading to 
have additional explosive atmosphere. The most influential failure is result from maintainer's activities. 
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Table 6.11 ATEX-HOF Area classification result for the basic paint mixing unit 
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 Figure 6.8 The envelop of external zones (Example of the fixed mixing vessel) 
 
6.3 Step 2: ATEX-HOF Ignition Source Assessment  Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as 
dangerous zone.  
 
Step 2-1: Presence of potential ignition sources  
Potential ignition sources are identified based on 13 possible ignition sources listed in EN 1127-1 
(Table 6.12).  
Table 6.12 Possible ignition sources according to EN 1127-1 (2011) 
- Hot surfaces - Electromagnetic waves 
- Flames, hot gases - Ionizing radiations 
- Mechanically generated sparks - High-frequency radiation 
- Sparks from electrical equipment - Ultrasonic 
- Static electricity - Adiabatic compression 
- Stray electric currents and cathodic corrosion protection - Chemical reactions 
- Lightning  
 
Once the presence of the ignition source is identified, the frequency of occurrence will be assessed (EN 
13463-1, 2009):  
1) occurrence during normal operation is the situation when the equipment are operating for 
their intended use within their design parameters;  
2) occurrence during foreseeable malfunction is the situation when the equipment/person do not 
perform the intended function/tasks; and such disturbances are known to occur in practice;  
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3) occurrence during rare malfunction is the situation that type of malfunction caused by 
equipment and/or person may happen only in rare instances.  
4) not relevant is applied when the situation is not mentioned above.  
 
Step 2-2: Effective ignition sources assessment  
It is known that one has to supply initial ignition energy to initiate combustion process. A flammable 
mixture air can be ignited by an external source of energy such as electric spark, a naked flame, hot 
vessel walls, etc. It is possible to ignite any flammable mixture only when the maximum generated 
energy is enough to ignite the mixture (above the minimum ignition energy, MIE).  
 
Step 2-3: Final ignition likelihood estimation 
 
In case that identified potential ignition source is effective, applied barriers and relevant human 
interventions should be considered. The Event tree has been built. There is one technical barrier 
applied: the ground system. As the provided technical document: Ptbf = 3.83×10-4.  
 
The operational barriers and other relevant operational activities are conducted by two people:  
 one is the operator performing daily tasks in a normal operation condition (Scenario 1); and  
 another is the maintainer conducting the maintenance activities (Scenario 2). 
 
According to the general working context and their personal working performances, the HEP were 
estimated by applying FUZZY CREAM. HEP (operator) =5.01×10-3. HEP (maintainer) =1.58×10-2.  
 
For each identified emission source (if it is not the zone NE), both internal and external ignition source 
assessment were conducted. The final ignition likelihood is assessed in the conservative way. The 
maximum value of the ignition likelihood among all identified potential ignition sources will be chosen 
as the final result. 
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  Internal Ignition Source Assessment 1): Flames, Hot gases due to the hot work 
 
   
Figure 6.9 Event tree analysis – Flames, hot gases due to the hot work 
 
Table 6.13 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure (B+C+D) Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 2,073E-05 (Rarely) Rarely 
  
Conclusion: In case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition likelihood is 
higher than the initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is not a sufficient 
safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence leading to have additional ignition 
likelihood.  
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  Internal Ignition Source Assessment 2): Mechanical Sparks due to the use of improper manual tools 
 
   
Figure 6.10 Event tree analysis – Mechanical Sparks due to the use of improper manual tools 
 
Table 6.14 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 2,073E-05 (Rarely) Rarely 
  
Conclusion: In case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition likelihood is 
higher than the initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is not a sufficient 
safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence leading to have additional ignition likelihood.  
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  Internal Ignition Source Assessment 3): Static electricity due to the use of metallic materials 
 
   
Figure 6.11 Event tree analysis – Static electricity due to the use of metallic materials 
 
Table 6.15 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 1,919E-06 (Not relevant) Not relevant 
  
Conclusion: Even in case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition 
likelihood is still in the range of initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is a 
good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial result assessed. 
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 Table 6.16 ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment (Internal assessment result: Rarely) 
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  External Ignition Source Assessment 1): Flames, Hot gases due to the hot work 
 
   
Figure 6.12 Event tree analysis – Flames, hot gases due to the hot work 
 
Table 6.17 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure (B+C+D) Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 2,073E-03 (Occasionally) Occasionally 
  
Conclusion: In case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition likelihood is 
higher than the initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is not a sufficient 
safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence leading to have additional ignition likelihood.  
Jie Geng, Ph.D. Dissertation Innovation Driven by Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Risk Assessment Methodologies and Standards: ATEX (Explosive Atmosphere) Risk Assessment Application   
Page 118 of 153   
 
  External Ignition Source Assessment 2): Mechanical Sparks due to the use of improper manual tools 
 
   
Figure 6.13 Event tree analysis – Mechanical Sparks due to the use of improper manual tools 
 
Table 6.18 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure (B+C+D) Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 2,073E-03 (Occasionally) Occasionally 
  
Conclusion: In case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition likelihood is 
higher than the initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is not a sufficient 
safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence leading to have additional ignition likelihood.  
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  External Ignition Source Assessment 3): Static Electricity due to the use of metallic materials 
 
   
Figure 6.14 Event tree analysis – Static Electricity due to the us of metallic materials 
 
Table 6.19 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure (B+C+D) Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 1,919E-06 (Not relevant) Not relevant 
  
Conclusion: Even in case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition 
likelihood is still in the range of initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is a 
good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial result assessed. 
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  External Ignition Source Assessment 4): Stray electrical currents, cathodic and corrosion protection 
 
   
Figure 6.15 Event tree analysis – Stray electrical currents, cathodic and corrosion protection 
 
Table 6.20 Final Ignition Likelihood Determination  
Initial Ignition Likelihood with applied barrier succeeding 
Probability to have additional ignition likelihood because of the barrier failure (B+C+D) Final Ignition Likelihood 
Not relevant 1,919E-07 (Not relevant) Not relevant 
  
Conclusion: Even in case of the applied barrier failure, the probability to have additional ignition 
likelihood is still in the range of initial ignition likelihood with applied barrier succeeding. Thus, this is a 
good safety culture condition where the result from HOF influence doesn't change the initial result assessed. 
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Table 6.21 ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment (External assessment result: Occasionally)   
1-Presence of potential ignition sources 
2-E
ffec
tive
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s 
3-Final ignition likelihood 
Pot
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ing 
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s) 
Fin
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gnit
ion 
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ood
 
Ext
erna
l Ig
nitio
n so
urce
s 
Hot
 Sur
face
 Electrical equipment may generate hot surface in case of failure. However, the temperature inside and outside of the equipment is less than the auto ignition temperature of flammable substances.  Not
 Rel
eva
nt 
-- N -- -- -- N.E
. 
Flam
es, H
ot g
ases
 
Flames and hot gases may be present due to the hot work during maintenance activities. 
Dur
ing 
fore
seea
ble 
mal
func
tion
 
1×1
0-1  Y 
Naked flame and hot gases as a product of combustion in zone 1 and zone 2 are eliminated. Meanwhile, the maintenance is performed by following the hot work permit requirements and procedures. (maintainer & operator) 2
.073
×10
-3  
Dur
ing 
fore
seea
ble 
mal
func
tion
 
Occ
asio
nall
y 
Mec
han
ical
 Spa
rks Mechanical sparks may be generated externally from the use of improper manual tools during the normal operation and maintenance activities. 
Dur
ing 
norm
al 
ope
ratio
n 
1 Y Inside the painting mixing room there are only ATEX required manual tools (technical barrier) -
- 
Not
 rele
van
t 
Occ
asio
nall
y 
Dur
ing 
fore
seea
ble 
mal
func
tion
 
1×1
0-1  Y 
Equipment that can produce mechanical sparks, during the normal operation, is prohibited in hazardous areas. (operator) 
2.07
3×1
0-3  
Dur
ing 
fore
seea
ble 
mal
func
tion
 
Maintainer from outside the paint mixing room is performing the maintenance with the safety requirement and following the procedure, e.g. always choose the ATEX required manual tools. (maintainer) 
Elec
trica
l Sp
arks
 
ATEX required electrical equipment are applied so that it is impossible to be effective even in case of failure. Not
 rele
van
t 
-- N -- -- -- N.E
. 
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Table 6.21 ATEX-HOF Ignition source assessment (External - cont.) 
1-Presence of potential ignition sources 
2-E
ffec
tive
nes
s 
3-Final ignition likelihood 
Pot
enti
al 
igni
tion
 sou
rces
 
Motivation for assessment 
Fre
que
ncy
 of o
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ce 
(wit
hou
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plie
d b
arr
iers
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PIG Barriers applied 
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 to h
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s Stat
ic E
lect
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The use of metallic materials may potentially cause disruptive discharges. 
Dur
ing 
the 
norm
al 
ope
ratio
n 
1 Y 
1) Bond all conductors together and to earth. (technical barrier) 
1.91
9×1
0-6  
Not
 rele
van
t 
N.E
. 
2) Periodic checking of the earth situation with taking into account of specific procedures. (operator) 
Parts of non-metallic material are present. With received technical documentation, the materials are made of antistatic material. Not
 rele
van
t 
-- N -- -- -- N.E
. 
Persons who are insulated from earth can easily acquire and retain an electrostatic charge. However, since the work equipment, during normal operation and in case of failure, cannot give rise to incendive discharges in hazardous areas, static electricity is not possible generated by person. 
Not
 rele
van
t 
-- N -- -- -- N.E
. 
Stra
y el
ectr
ical
 cur
rent
s, C
atho
dic 
and
 
Cor
rosi
on p
rote
ctio
n It is possible to be present during the maintenance (e.g. welding operations) because stray currents can flow in electrically conductive systems or parts of systems. 
Dur
ing 
fore
seea
ble 
mal
func
tion
 
1×1
0-1  Y 
1) The potential compensation system is provided, such as the grounding system. Bond all conductors together and to earth. (technical barrier) 
1.91
9×1
0-7  
Not
 rele
van
t 
N.E
. 
2) Periodic checking the compensation system with taking into account of specific procedures. (operator) 
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6.4 Step 3: ATEX-HOF Damage Analysis   
ATEX-HOF damage analysis relies on the Area classification result and other factors. Given to the 
guidance of the ATEX risk assessment application (Cavaliere and Scardamaglia, 2005; and Cavaliere, 
2011), the formulas and indexes support the calculation of the semi-quantitative parameter DHOF. If the 
zone prediction changes in the ATEX-HOF Area classification, the ID value is also changed as IDHOF.   
 
                            DHOF = IDHOF + PL + KG + VZ + CN (for gas)                                  Eq. (6.1) 
 
6.5 Step 4: ATEX-HOF Risk Evaluation  
According to Table 4.9 in Chapter 4, the values of PHOF, CHOF, and DHOF can be determined through the 
results from Step 1 to Step 3. The ATEX-HOF risk (RHOF) was the multiplication of PHOF, CHOF, and 
DHOF (RHOF = PHOF×CHOF×DHOF), and the final risk level can be ranked.  
Table 6.22 Traditional ATEX Risk evaluation result for the basic paint mixing unit (in case of relevant operational activities and applied barriers success) 
Emission Source Area Classification P Effectiveness of Ignition Source C D R = P×C×D Risk Level 
Paint Loading Container 
Internal  (liquid surface) 3 Internal:  Not relevant 0 3 R<1 Negligible External (opening) 2 External:  Not relevant 0 2 R<1 Negligible External (leakage) 1 0 1 R<1 Negligible 
Fixed process mixing vessel 
Internal  (liquid surface) 3 Internal:  Not relevant 0 3 R<1 Negligible External (opening) 2 External:  Not relevant 0 2 R<1 Negligible External (leakage) 1 1 R<1 Negligible 
Supply system 
Internal  (liquid surface) 3 Internal:  Not relevant 0 3 R<1 Negligible External  (structural emission) 2 External:  Not relevant 0 
2 R<1 Negligible 
External (leakage) 1 1 R<1 Negligible 
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Table 6.23 The ATEX-HOF Risk evaluation result for the basic paint mixing unit (in case of relevant operational activities and applied barriers failure) 
Emission Source Area Classification P HO
F Effectiveness of Ignition Source C HO
F 
D HO
F RHOF = PHOF×CHOF×DHOF Risk Level 
Paint Loading Container 
Internal (liquid surface) 3 Internal: Rarely 1 3 9 Low External (opening) 2 External:  Occasionally 2 2 8 Low External (leakage) 2 2 8 Low 
Fixed process mixing vessel 
Internal (liquid surface) 3 Internal: Rarely 1 3 9 Low External (opening) 2 External: Occasionally 2 2 8 Low External (leakage) 2 2 8 Low 
Supply system 
Internal (liquid surface) 3 Internal: Rarely 1 3 9 Low External  (structural emission) 2 External:  Occasionally 2 
2 8 Low 
External (leakage) 2 2 8 Low 
 
6.6 Results for the ATEX-HOF Risk Assessment  
 
As mentioned above, the risk level of the basic paint mixing unit is NEGLIGIBLE for all the identified 
emission sources (internal and external sides) in case of the following applied barriers and/or relevant 
operational activities correctly performing: 
1) Naked flame and hot gases as a product of combustion are forbidden in zone 0, and in zone 1 and 
zone 2 are eliminated.  
2) The maintenance is performed under the safety requirements (e.g. hot work permit).  
3) The maintenance is performed following the required procedures.  
4) Equipment that can produce mechanical sparks is prohibited in hazardous areas.  
5) Periodic checking of the earth situation with taking into account of specific procedures.  
6) Inside the paint mixing room there are only ATEX required manual tools.  
7) Periodic checking the compensation system with taking into account of particular procedures.  
8) People inside the room are always wearing the antistatic clothes and shoes.  
9) Even in case of changing operators, maintainers, or equipment, the ATEX risk needs to be re-
evaluated. 
 
However, when taking into account of the failure of applied barriers and/or relevant operational 
activities, the risk level of the basic paint mixing unit goes up to LOW level. Risk mitigation measures 
should be implemented in a long time interval.  
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                                                Chapter 7. Discussion  
 
 
Chapter Objectives: 
7.1 Sensitivity about the HOF Influence 
7.2 Applicability 
7.3 Cost Analysis 
7.4 Feedback from Stakeholders 
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Chapter 7. Discussion  
 
7.1 Sensitivity about the HOF Influence  
In nowadays, the change in safety has focused on developing good safety cultures that positively 
influence human behavior at work to reduce errors and violations. Safety culture is not a difficult idea, 
but it is generally considered as “trust”, “values” and “attitudes”, which is difficult to clarify the 
meaning in practise. The ATEX-HOF Methodology deals with the HOF influence on the identified 
ATEX hazards. The Event tree based probabilistic assessment method has been introduced in order to 
quantify the HOF influence. It can be concerned as an attempt to handle safety cultures (with HOF 
influence) in practice via the integration of the risk assessment.        
 
1) With a sufficient (or Good) safety culture, results coming from the ATEX-HOF Methodology would 
be as the same as the traditional methodology. 
 
Risk Level (The ATEX-HOF Methodology) = Risk Level (Traditional methodology) 
 
2) However, with an insufficient (or Poor) safety culture, results coming from the ATEX-HOF 
Methodology would be different, which should be the integration of the result taking from the 
traditional methodology and the HOF influence.     
 
Risk Level (The ATEX-HOF Methodology) = Risk Level (Traditional methodology) + HOF Influence 
 
7.2 Applicability  
ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment here is required when any equipment or protective 
systems are intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. Those industries can be classified as: 
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1) ATEX Equipment End-users, such as: process industries (e.g. food industry, chemical industry, etc.), 
manufacturing industries (e.g. automotive manufacturing industry), energy industries (e.g. power 
plant), and transportation sector.   
 
2) ATEX Equipment Producers: Directive 94/9/EC defines the minimum technical requirements and 
conformity assessment procedures, to be applied before the equipment intended for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres workplace. Although the ATEX risk assessment is generally applied for a 
workplace risk assessment, here it is also applied where the industries produce ATEX equipment and 
prepare for the ATEX Equipment End-user market.     
 
7.3 Cost Analysis  
 
The additional consuming time, people involved, process interruption, and the source request are 
considered (Table 7.1). For each analysis, additional 2-4 minutes are required. The additional source 
supports are the FUZZY CREAM tool and the Event tree instrument. Additional works include: a) 
identification of applied technical barriers and human interventions; b) estimation of failure probability 
of applied technical barriers and relevant human interventions; c) Event Tree Analysis. 
 
7.4 Feedback from Stakeholders 
 
A feedback was collected from the industry where the ATEX-HOF methodology was applied. The 
questionnaire survey was conducted (Table 7.2). The responses are summarized: a) The ATEX-HOF 
Methodology covered the process phases: design phase, normal operation, maintenance, and non-
routine situation. b) It is necessary to consider HOF within the ATEX risk assessment, and the ATEX-
HOF Methodology is helpful for the HOF influence analysis. c) The results coming from the ATEX-
HOF Methodology is clear to support decision making. d) The application doesn’t disturb the 
operations. However, a) half responses concern a high-level of education needed, in order to apply the 
methodology. b) Half responses concern that conducting the quantitative analysis is a little time 
consuming.   
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Table 7.1 Additional costs from the ATEX-HOF Methodology  (Comparing with the traditional ATEX risk assessment methodology) 
ATEX Risk Assessment Procedures Additional Works to Apply the ATEX-HOF Methodology  
Additional Time Consumption 
Additional People Involved 
Additional Process Interruption 
Additional Source Support 
1- A
rea 
Cla
ssif
icat
ion 
1.1- Emission Source Identification -- -- -- -- -- 1.2- Type of Internal Zone -- -- -- -- -- 
1.3- Type of External Zone 
For each source of release analysis, additional works: - Identification of applied barriers and other operational activities; - Estimation of Probability (Success or Failure) of applied barriers and other human interventions. - Event Tree Analysis - External Zone Determination 
With a good training background, the analyst needs 2-4 minutes. 
-- -- 
- FUZZY CREAM Tool; - Event Tree Analysis support 
2- I
gnit
ion 
Sou
rce 
Iden
tific
atio
n 2.1-Potential Ignition Source Presence -- -- -- -- -- 2.2-Effective Ignition Source Assessment -- -- -- -- -- 
2.3-Final Ignition Likelihood Estimation 
For each ignition source analysis, additional works: - Identification of applied barriers and other operational activities; - Estimation of Probability (Success or Failure) of applied barriers and other human interventions. - Event Tree Analysis - External Zone Determination 
With a good training background, the analyst needs 2-4 minutes. 
-- -- 
- FUZZY CREAM Tool; - Event Tree Analysis support 
3- C
ons
equ
enc
e A
naly
sis 
Semi-quantitative analysis based on indexes -- -- -- -- -- 
4- A
TEX
 Ris
k E
valu
atio
n 
Semi-quantitative approach -- -- -- -- -- 
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Table 7.2 Feedback: the ATEX-HOF Methodology Application in the Paint Mixing Room 
1. Is the ATEX-HOF methodology able to be applied in the FAS on-site application?      (ATEX: Explosive Atmosphere; HOF: Human and Organizational Factor)   Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 100.00% 4 2 No 0.00% 0 3 No idea 0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 2. Does the ATEX-HOF methodology cover all process phases? The ATEX-HOF methodology considered (multiple choice):   Response Percent Response Total 1 activities in the plant design phase (e.g. original installation of the plant) 50.00% 2 
2 activities during the normal operation (e.g. the daily paint mixing activities) 100.00% 4 3 activities during the maintenance activities (e.g. repairing the equipment) 100.00% 4 4 activities in the non-routine situations (e.g. foreseeable malfunction) 100.00% 4 
 skipped 0 3. Do you think it is necessary to take into account Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) inside the ATEX risk assessment?   Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 100.00% 4 2 No (please specify):  0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 4. Is the ATEX-HOF methodology helpful that enable you to do the Human risk assessment? 
  Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 66.67% 3 2 No, (please specify): 33.33% 0 
 skipped 1 5. Do you think that the ATEX-HOF methodology needs a high-level education background? 
  Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 50.00% 2 2 No 25.00% 1 3 No idea 25.00% 1 
 skipped 0 6. Is the developed procedure of the ATEX-HOF methodology complicate to apply?   Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes, it is complicate. 25.00% 1 2 No, it is fine. 50.00% 2 3 I have no idea. 0.00% 0 4 Other (please specify): 25.00% 1 
 skipped 0 Other (please specify): (1) 
1 It depends from the check list, and how much the operation tool will be user friendly. 
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Table 7.2 Feedback of the ATEX-HOF Methodology Application in the Paint Mixing Room (cont.) 
7. Is the ATEX-HOF methodology a time consuming method? 
  Response Percent Response Total 1 No, it is efficient. 25.00% 1 2 Well, It is a little time consuming, but acceptable. 50.00% 2 3 Yes, it is a waste of time. 25.00% 1 4 I have no idea. 0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 8. Does the ATEX-HOF risk assessment disturb the operations during the application? 
  Response Percent Response Total 1 No, it is fine. 100.00% 4 2 Sometimes, but it is acceptable 0.00% 0 3 Yes, it frequently disturbs our daily operations  0.00% 0 4 Other (please specify):  0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 9. Does the results (from the ATEX-HOF risk assessment) match the national or company regulations/standards?   Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 75.00% 3 2 No  0.00% 0 3 I have no idea 25.00% 1 
 skipped 0 10. Do you think it is necessary to conduct the quantitative analysis instead of the qualitative analysis for the ATEX risk assessment?   Response Percent Response Total 
1 Yes, we need specific numbers (e.g. probability), in order to know more accurate results. 50.00% 2 
2 Well, sometimes, in the critical tasks, we need; however, most of the time, qualitative analysis is enough. 50.00% 2 
3 No, qualitative analysis is better. Quantitative analysis (numbers) is useless for us.  0.00% 0 4 I have no idea.  0.00% 0 5 Other (please specify):  0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 11. Is the result from the ATEX-HOF methodology clear to support decision making? 
  Response Percent Response Total 1 Yes 100.00% 4 2 No 0.00% 0 3 Other (please specify): 0.00% 0 
 skipped 0 12. Others that you think that needs to improve? 
  Response Percent Response Total 100.00% 2 
1 Question 7: It is not a "waste" of time, just it seems that quite a long time is necessary. 
2 It was not showed how to measure CPC 9 - Crew collaboration Quality, and how it depends from single person? What is the effect of Human nature of the single worker? And how do you address Human nature of single worker? 
 
 skipped 2   
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8.1 Summary of the Research 
8.2 Strengths of the Research Work 
8.3 Further Work 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
8.1 Summary of the Research 
 
ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment is required when any equipment or system potentially 
causes explosive atmospheres. Despite many operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous 
substances are performed by operators, influences of human and organizational factor (HOF) are 
mostly neglected from the ATEX risk assessment. This research work, according to the overview of the 
general risk assessment and human factor integration techniques, focuses on the HOF influence on a 
specific application domain: the ATEX (explosive atmosphere) risk assessment domain. It aims to 
propose an advanced methodology, in order to analyze the HOF influence on ATEX hazards. The 
roadmap of this research was followed: 
 
Stage 1. Introduction & Background  
 
Current risk assessment relevant safety standards were reviewed, and the current application in 
industries was investigated via the interview. However, with reviewing the risk assessment 
methodologies suggested by those standards, Human and Organizational Factor (HOF) is not sufficient 
handled factor in a risk assessment, but can be identified among all phases of a system life cycle. 
Meanwhile, the 16 industries’ interviews were conducted by all INNHF fellows. As a part of the 
results, it has also shown that across all sectors use standards to support their risk assessment and safety 
management. The international standards most used were OHSAS 18001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and 
ISO 31000. No human factors standards were mentioned by any interviewee.  
 
Hence, questions occur: “Are current safety standards and their suggested risk assessment 
methodologies enough to apply without considering human and organizational factors (HOF)?” “How 
to analyse the HOF influence on identified hazards”? With these questions, in Chapter 2, an overview 
of current Risk Assessment Methodologies and Human Factor Integration (HFI) techniques was 
conducted, in order to try to find a way on the HFI. 
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Stage 2. Literature Review 
 
ISO/IEC 31010:2009 described 31 risk assessment methodologies. Most of them are qualitative 
methods. In addition, Marhavilas, et al. (2011) reviewed the scientific literature from 2000-2009, and 
summarized 18 risk assessment methodologies. The review work was mainly based on their 
contributions. The review of the common applied risk assessment methodologies was conducted in 
three groups: qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid groups.  
 
Evans (1976) explained that human reliability is a probability that a person correctly performs some 
system-required activities in a required time period, and performs no extraneous activity that can 
degrade the system. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a method that human reliability is estimated. 
The review work on HRA techniques was based on Hollnagel (1998) consideration with two 
categories: 1) Task-dominant approaches that concerns human doing a task as the consequence of 
success and failure; and 2) Cognition-dominant approaches concerns human cognitions as causes of the 
human failure.  
 
According to the reviewed work, in the risk identification phase, HOF can be identified as different 
type of sources to support the risk identification. In the risk analysis phase, HRA technique provides 
the instruments that enable to support both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis. In the risk 
evaluation phase, HOF was proposed to be integrated as a part of the traditional risk assessment which 
can be interactive with the functional analysis result.  
 
Stage 3. The ATEX-HOF Methodology Development 
 
Cavaliere and Scardamaglia (2005) and Cavaliere (2011) provided a methodology for the ATEX risk 
assessment that fulfills the requirements of both ATEX Directive 94/9/EC, Directive 99/92/EC, and 
related standards. Here, the ATEX-HOF methodology was proposed based on this methodology. In 
order to address two challenges: 1) HOF influence on identified ATEX hazards; and 2) HOF 
quantification, the framework of the ATEX-HOF methodology was developed with four steps: 1) Area 
classification, 2) Ignition source identification, 3) Damage analysis, and 4) ATEX Risk evaluation. 
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Figure 8.1 The framework of the ATEX-HOF methodology (Geng, et al., 2015a) 
On the other hand, two representative HRA techniques (THERP and FUZZY CREAM) were applied 
and compared. The application of FUZZY CREAM provided a simpler, rapid, but effective way to 
support the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).   
 
Stage 4. Application of the ATEX-HOF Methodology 
 
Two applications of the ATEX-HOF Methodology in real industries (a food industry and an automotive 
industry) were conducted. Meanwhile, the traditional and ATEX-HOF Methodology were compared, in 
order to see the performance of the ATEX-HOF Methodology, and then to improve the developed 
methodology. In the end, the research work is completed.                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
8.2 Strengths of the Research Work  
The ATEX-HOF methodology provides a quantitative risk analysis approach with taking into account 
of the Human and Organizational Factors (HOF). Inside each phase, clearly assessment goals are 
identified which are enable to conduce the ATEX risk assessment with simplified ‘step-by-step’. An 
 
Risk Evaluation 
Monitoring 4. ATEX Risk Level Analysis RHOF= PHOF*CHOF*DHOF 
Mitigation of Risks 
5. Is this risk tolerable? 
   
Area Classification 
1. ATEX Area Classification Analysis → P 
1a. ATEX-HOF Area Classification Analysis Explicating HOF → PHOF 
    
Ignition Sources Assessment 
2. ATEX Ignition Sources Analysis → C 
2a. ATEX-HOF Ignition Sources Analysis Explicating HOF  → CHOF 
 
Damage Analysis 
3. ATEX Damage Analysis → D 
3a. ATEX Damage Analysis Explicating HOF → DHOF 
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event tree based probabilistic assessment has been introduced. Hence, the ATEX-HOF risk assessment 
becomes more complete than the traditional approach.  
 
The on-site applications shown how taking into account HOFs is particular important in companies 
where the usual hypothesis of the correctness of operator intervention (in maintenance, normal 
operations, and emergency) could bring to not conservative results. The applied operational (HOF) 
barriers explicated in the analysis can be used to support for defining a more detailed set of operational 
procedures, which is able to maintain the risk level evaluated. 
 
8.3 Further work  
In future, 1) more case studies are expected to apply, in order to validate the performance of the ATEX-
HOF Methodology. 2) Relevant software is expected to develop, with the aim of supporting safety 
analyst easier to apply the ATEX-HOF Methodology (e.g. reducing the time for the calculation). 3) 
Standardization: the ATEX-HOF Methodology is expecting to propose as ANNEX (for alternative 
method) to support and complete the relevant safety standards. 
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Annex A. Proposals for the ATEX Relevant Standards 
 
 
Chapter Objectives: 
A.1 Relevant Standards 
A.2 Proposal 1: Integration of the ATEX-HOF Methodology into IEC 60079-10-1 
A.3 Proposal 2: Integration of the ATEX-HOF Methodology into EN 13463-1  
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Annex A. Proposals for the ATEX Relevant Standards 
 
A.1 Relevant Standards  
The ATEX Area classification deals with situations of normal operation, maintenance, and predictable 
failures; and it is mainly referred to two standards: IEC 60079-10-1 (for gas, 2008) and IEC 60079-10-
2 (for dust, 2009). For specific applications, different countries developed dedicated guidelines, as in 
Italy CEI 31-35 (2012) and CEI 31-56 (2007).  
 
Ignition source assessment is the second step to go through if the zone classification is determined as a 
dangerous zone. EN 13463-1 (2009) is a standard for Non-electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially 
Explosive Atmospheres. The standard aims to provide the basic method and requirements for design, 
construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres. Following the procedure, the equipment can be verified and marked with ATEX 
markings for the further use in different ATEX zones’ working environment. Since EN 13463-1 covers 
most common ignition sources and explicates the procedure to identify 13 ignition sources listed in EN 
1127-1 (2011), the ATEX-HOF methodology takes a part of EN 13463-1 to apply as the method for the 
ignition source assessment. As mentioned above, the following standards are mainly applied among 
conducting the ATEX risk assessment: 
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Table A.1 Targeted ATEX Relevant Standards 
Relevant Standards/ ANNEX/Guidelines Description of Relevant Standards/ ANNEX/Guidelines 
IEC 60079-10-1, 2008, Explosive atmospheres - Part 10-1: Classification of areas - Explosive gas atmospheres. IEC 60079-10-2, 2009, Explosive atmospheres - Part 10-2: Classification of areas - Explosive dust atmospheres. EN 1127-1, 2011, Explosive atmospheres - explosion prevention and protection - Part 1: Basic concepts and methodology. EN 13463, 2009, Non-electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
IEC 60079-10-1: This part of IEC 60079 is concerned with the classification of areas where flammable gas or vapour or mist hazards may arise and may then be used as a basis to support the proper selection and installation of equipment for use in a hazardous area. IEC 60079-10-2: The standard is concerned with the identification and classification of areas where explosive dust atmospheres and combustible dust layers are present, in order to permit the proper assessment of ignition sources in such areas. EN 1127-1: This European Standard specifies methods for the identification and assessment of hazardous situations leading to explosion and the design and construction measures appropriate for the required safety. This is achieved by risk assessment and risk reduction. EN 13463-1: This European Standard specifies the basic method and requirements for design, construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres in air of gas, vapour, mist and dusts.  
IMPROVEMENTS ON EXISTING METHODS/STANDARDS MENTIONED ABOVE 
The integrated ATEX-HOF methodology is proposed, with the aim of providing an advanced methodology to analyze HOF influences on ATEX hazards. Among these procedures mentioned in the standards above, HOF is identified as a type of barriers that can influence on determining the external zone (ATEX Area classification) and the final ignition likelihood (ATEX Ignition source identification). The Event tree is introduced to support the quantification analysis. 
 
A.2 Proposal 1: Integration of the ATEX-HOF Methodology into IEC 60079-10-1 
 
The scope of IEC 60079-10-1 (2008) concerns with the classification of areas where flammable gas or 
vapour or mist hazards may arise and may then be used as a basis to support the proper selection and 
installation of equipment for use in a hazardous area. General procedures include: 
 
     1) Source of release identification: Each item of the process equipment which contains flammable 
materials is considered as a potential release source, such as a tank, pump, pipeline, vessel, etc. 
     2) Determining the internal zone of the identified release source, on the basis of the grade of 
release and the ventilation.  
     3) Determining the external zone of the identified release source is on the basis of release rate, 
lower explosive limit (LEL), ventilation and other factors (such as climatic conditions and topography).  
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Among these procedures, HOF is identified as a type of barriers and/or relevant operational 
activities that can influence on determining the external zone. In case to take into account of HOF 
influence on the external zone determination, HOF is proposed to be inserted into the clause 5.4.5 of 
IEC 60079-10-1 (2008) as one of other parameters to be considered. 
 
   
 
For the detailed information to analyze HOF influences on ATEX hazards, an annex is proposed: 
5.4 Extent of zone     …… Where the source of release is situated outside an area or in an adjoining area, the penetration of a significant quantity of flammable gas or vapour into the area can be prevented by suitable means such as:      a) physical barriers and/or operational barriers (e.g. maintenance activities, operation inspections);      b) maintaining a sufficient overpressure in the area relative to the adjacent hazardous areas, so preventing the ingress of the explosive gas atmosphere;      c) purging the area with sufficient flow of fresh air, so ensuring that the air escapes from all openings where the flammable gas or vapour may enter.  The extent of the zone is mainly affected by the following chemical and physical parameters, some of which are intrinsic properties of the flammable material; others are specific to the process. For simplicity, the effect of each parameter listed below assumes that the other parameters remain unchanged.  5.4.1 Release rate of gas or vapour     …… 5.4.5 Other Parameters to be considered a) Climatic conditions       …… b) Topography      …… c) Human and organizational factors (HOF) Since many operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous substances are performed by operators, influences of human and organizational factor (HOF) should be taken into account. The HOF can be considered as a type of barriers (technical barriers and/or operational barriers) and/or relevant operational activities with a potential probability to fail. Hence, those human interventions can influence the external zone determination.  
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Annex X (informative) HOF Influence Analysis and  An Alternative Approach for the External Zone Determination 
   X.1 General  The purpose of this annex is to provide guidance in analysing the Human and Organizational Factor (HOF) influences and to extend Clause 5 for the extent of zone determination. The method developed allows the determination of the external zone by  estimating the initial probability of having an internal explosive atmosphere (PrIN);  calculating the failure probabilities of applied barriers and other human interventions (PrBF);  calculating the final likelihood of having an explosive atmosphere (PSA);  determining the external zone.  It is a quantitative analysis approach that can be used as an alternative approach for the external zone determination if the probability information can be collected.  
 X.2 HOF influence identification  The external zone depends on the estimated (or calculated) distance over the area that explosive atmosphere exists before it disperses with appropriate safety factors. Where the release spreads in the surrounding area, the penetration of a significant quantity of flammable substances into the area can be influenced by applied barriers (technical barriers and/or operational barriers), human related operating and maintaining activities, and sufficient ventilations. The extension of the critical external zone must be determined with the consideration of applied barriers and/or other human interventions.   X.3 PSA Event tree  The Event tree (Papazoglou, 1998) is here introduced for a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The initial event (Figure X.1) has an initial probability (PrIN) that represents the internal explosive atmosphere occurrence. A series of possible paths are constructed by applied barriers and relevant operational activities. Each path is assigned with a probability of failure (PrBF) or success (PrBS). The probability allows to calculate the likelihood of having an explosive atmosphere (PSA).  
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 Figure X.1 Event tree structure for the external zone determination  
X.3.1 Initial probability of internal explosive atmosphere occurrence (PrIN) 
In order to define the PrIN, Table X.1 is applied which correlates the area classification to the probability of the explosive atmosphere presence.   In case the equipment/components of a system which includes flammable products is continuously or frequently using, the internal zone is determined as Zone 0/20, and the probability to have explosive atmosphere will be higher than 10-1;   In case the equipment/components of a system which includes flammable products is sporadically using, the internal zone is determined as Zone 1/21, and the probability to have explosive atmosphere will be in the range from 10-1 to 10-3;   In case the equipment/components of a system which includes flammable products is not using or infrequently using, the internal zone is determined as Zone 2/22, and the probability to have explosive atmosphere will be in the range from 10-3 to 10-5. 
Table X.1 Area classification depending on the probability of explosive atmosphere occurrence in a year  
Area Classification Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Occurrence in 365 days (PSA) Descriptor 
Zone 0/20 P>10-1 Explosive atmosphere is continuously present, for long periods or frequently. 
Zone 1/21 10-1≥P>10-3 Explosive atmosphere is sporadically present, during normal operations. 
Zone 2/22 10-3≥P>10-5 Explosive atmosphere is not present during normal operations, or infrequently present, for a short period. 
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 X.4 HEP Estimation: human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques  Several types of methodologies are used for identifying and quantifying human error and among them are the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human reliability is the probability that a person correctly performs some system-required activities in a required time period, and performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the system. 
 
X.4.1 FUZZY CREAM 
Taking FUZZY CREAM as an example, CREAM with the FUZZY application meets the need for simple, rapid but effective tool, and it can be employed for various industries. CREAM - Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method covers technical, human and organizational factors, and provides a relatively stable HEP output. It provides a two-level method to calculate Human Error Probability (HEP): the basic method and the extended method. In the practice point of view, the basic method enables safety managers making a fast decision with a macro consideration of HEP. The extended method deals with the specific action failure probability. The HEP estimation in our study was based on the CREAM basic method. The basic method uses task analysis to identify human actions, and assesses Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) by judging the expected effects and making a combined score of them with 
the triplet [reduced, not significant, improved]. The 9 Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) take into account of both human and organizational factors which are:  
      CPC 1-Adequacy of Organization       CPC 2-Working Conditions       CPC 3- Adequacy of MMI and Operational Support       CPC 4- Availability of Procedures / Plans       CPC 5- Number of Simultaneous Goals       CPC 6- Available Time       CPC 7- Time of Day (Circadian Rhythm)       CPC 8- Adequacy of Training and Experience       CPC9- Crew Collaboration Quality  Final results are interpreted through a control mode matrix defined by the Contextual Control Mode (COCOM): 1) Strategic Control, 2) Tactical Control, 3) Opportunistic Control, and 4) Scrambled Control. The COCOM model not only defined the control modes, but also provided HEP probability ranges (Table X.2). Starting from the CREAM basic method, a dedicated tool was developed to apply FUZZY CREAM. Figure X.2 shows the inputs’ membership functions. After experts judge the input vector (9 CPCs), the HEP output will be generated by the FUZZY CREAM tool via the Centroid defuzzification method. 
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 Figure X.2 FUZZY Sets of Nice CPC Inputs 
Table X.2 Control modes with the logarithm format as Fuzzy output sets  
Human Error Probability (HEP) 
UOD Number of Fuzzy Sets Level/ Descriptors HEP Ranges 
Membership Level Intervals (Logarithm Format) 
[0,1] 4 
Strategic 0.5 ×10-5˂ P ˂ 1.0 ×10-2 -5.3 to -2.3 Tactical 1.0 ×10-3˂ P ˂ 1.0 ×10-1 -3.3 to -1.3 Opportunistic 1.0 ×10-2˂ P ˂ 0.5 -2.3 to -0.3 
Scrambled 1.0 ×10-1˂ P ˂ 1.0 -1.3 to 0  X.5 Results of the ATEX-HOF Area classification 
As a result, all identified release sources from both internal and external zone classification of any equipment are summarized in Table X.3. Further, with the sum of extension calculation from all external zones (the vertical and horizontal dimensions), the envelop of the external zones are drawn on the layout to understand the critical area. Therefore, the final analysis is completed. 
Table X.3 ATEX-HOF Area classification result 
Emission Source 
Internal Source of Release 
Internal Grade of Release 
Internal Zone 
External Source of Release 
External Grade of Release 
Relevant Operational Activities and/or Applied Barriers 
PSA (Probability to have additional explosive atmosphere) 
External Zone 
E.S. S.R. Continuous/ Primary/ Secondary 
Zone 0/20, Zone 1/21, Zone 2/22, Zone NE 
S.R. Continuous/ Primary/ Secondary 
Technical Barriers/ Operational Barriers/ Other relevant operational activities 
Integration of : 1) the initial probability (PrIN); and 2) Prob. of Barrier/operational Failure (e.g. HEP, Ptbf) 
Zone 0/20, Zone 1/21, Zone 2/22, Zone NE 
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A.3 Proposal 2: Integration of the ATEX-HOF Methodology into EN 13463-1  
The scope of EN 13463-1 (2009): This European Standard specifies the basic method and 
requirements for design, construction, testing and marking of non-electrical equipment intended for use 
in potentially explosive atmospheres in air of gas, vapour, mist and dusts. Such atmospheres can also 
exist inside the equipment. The general procedure to conduct the ignition source identification includes: 
 Presence of potential ignition sources; 
 Effective ignition source assessment; 
 Final ignition likelihood estimation. 
Among these procedures, HOF is identified as a type of barriers and/or other human interventions 
that can influence on the final ignition likelihood estimation. In case to take into account of HOF 
influence, HOF is proposed to be inserted into the Annex B.4.3-Determination of Measures in EN 
13463-1:2009. 
 
For the detailed information to analyze HOF influences on ATEX ignition hazards, an annex is proposed: 
    ……  B.4.3 Determination of Measures  If the evaluation shows the application is required to meet the target category adequate preventive and/or protective measures are determined in this step (see Table B.3, Column 3). It is necessary to define these measures in such a way that possible ignition sources cannot become effective or the probability of the ignition source becoming effective is sufficiently low. These measures can be both of technical barriers and/or other human interventions ……  Table B.3 – Examples for reporting of the determination of preventive or protective measures (step 3)  and the concluding estimation and categorisation (step 4) 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
Measures applied to prevent the ignition source becoming effective 
PSA
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   Annex X (informative) 
HOF Influence Analysis and  A Quantitative Approach to Determine the Final Ignition Likelihood 
 X.1 General  Since many operations on plant and equipment containing dangerous substances are performed by operators, influences of human and organizational factor (HOF) should be taken into account. The purpose of this annex is to provide guidance in analysing the HOF influences and to extend Annex B for the ignition hazard assessment. The method developed allows determining the final ignition likelihood by  estimating an initial probability of having a potential ignition source (PrIG);  calculating failure probabilities of applied barriers and other human interventions (PrBF);  calculating the final likelihood of having an effective ignition source (PSA);  determining the final likelihood of having an effective ignition source.  It is a quantitative analysis approach that can be used as an alternative approach for the final ignition likelihood determination if the probability information can be collected.   X.2 HOF influence identification  In case that identified potential ignition source is effective, applied barriers (both of technical barriers and/or operational barriers) and other human interventions can influence the final ignition likelihood. The Event tree is built (Figure X.1). The initial event is characterized by the initial probability of the ignition source presence (PrIG). Series paths are constructed by applied barriers and other relevant operational activities. The barrier failures can be result from the technical barrier failure (Prtbf) and/or the operational failure (HEP). The probability allows calculating the likelihood of having an effective ignition sources. Since the initial assessment of the ignition source presence is a qualitative value, it cannot be calculated directly in the Event tree. Different from Area classification that can take advantage of probability indexes from Italian Guidelines, the ATEX-HOF Ignition 
source assessment linked with the uniform probability ranges from the Area classification (Table X.1).  
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 Figure X.1 PSA Event tree for the final ignition likelihood estimation 
Table X.1 Linking probability ranges with the frequency of occurrence 
Ignition Likelihood 
Frequency of Occurrence Assessment for Ignition Sources  (EN 13463-1, 2009) 
Probability of Explosive Atmosphere Formation in 365 days (CEI 31-56, 2007; CEI 31-35, 2012) 
Area Classification 
Frequently During normal operation P>10-1 Zone 0/20 Occasionally During foreseeable malfunction 10-1≥P>10-3 Zone 1/21 Rarely During rare malfunction 10-3≥P>10-5 Zone 2/22 N.E. Not relevant 10-5>P Zone NE  X.3 Quantitative Analysis of Barrier Failure (PrBF)  The applied barriers consist of technical barriers and/or operational barriers. These barriers are also characterized through a potential probability to fail (PrBF): 1) the probability of the technical barrier failure (Ptbf), which can be estimated by using the function analysis with the relevant technical document; 2) the probability of the operational failure (in terms of the HEP) that can be estimated by applying human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques.  Several types of methodologies are used for identifying and quantifying human error and among them are the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human reliability is the probability that a person correctly performs some system-required activities in a required time period, and performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the system, such as THERP, FUZZY CREAM, and etc. 
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